Bezpieczeństwo zbiorowe i suwerenność narodowa. 25 lat Węgier w NATO

It is crucial to remember this, peculiarly erstwhile it comes from a nation that takes large pride in its alleged “sovereigntist” abroad policy. It is besides essential to comprehend the motivations behind the statements made by Hungarian decision makers. In this framework, we should start with the protracted historical journey taken by Central European nations, specified as Poland and Hungary, to transform into what are referred to as “small states” in global relations theory. Although present Poland – unlike Hungary – is simply a large state with serious military performance, this was not always the case. An existence as a Central European tiny state was not unfamiliar to them in the 18th and 19th centuries.

But if you look back to the 16th and 17th centuries, where I would like to start this story, the predecessors of both Poland and Hungary were major large powers and regional actors. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Austro-Hungarian monarchy were fundamentally what we can call “policy makers” and not “policy takers” in the sense of influencing not just their local neighbourhood but regional and wider European politics as well. As a consequence of the 20th century, I must say that we have lost that privilege due to the emergence of firstly Russia, then Germany, and yet the russian Union. So, we were always in a position here in Central Europe where there was a constant conflict to simply last and regain territorial integrity and statehood as we know it.

NATO provides the chance to overcome that and advancement forward. In the end, we are in a situation where we do not gotta constantly fear for our basic endurance and NATO is the main reason for this reality. This is beneficial to us here in Central Europe, peculiarly due to the American atomic shield, as well as the general US sense of global and abroad affairs. It is crucial to mention this here due to the fact that occasionally Hungarian abroad policy – which is more favourable to Donald Trump than it is to Democrats, for example – is misunderstood. Of course, organization politics leads to ideological arguments, but it has nothing to do with our knowing of the American planet order in general. However, do not be misled in this regard. Budapest is content with the current state of affairs in the world, with the United States as the hegemonic power. The rule-based global order is inactive the cornerstone of Hungarian abroad policy, regardless of the various political and ideological controversies that have arisen over the past 25 years.

My second point relates to events which took place in 1989. There was, in fact, a case made for the necessity of NATO following the fall of the russian Union. It goes without saying that the first question was why does NATO even exist? There is simply a well-known proverb that emphasizes NATO’s political orientation. According to Lord Ismay, it was imperative that we keep the russian Union out, the Americans in and the Germans down. The key question though, is whether this maxim has changed or is inactive the same in the wake of the fall of the russian Union. And I think it has changed now.

While there may be any fact to the thought that Germany as a unified state presented challenges for France and another major European powers in the past, NATO has evolved into something more akin to a policy institution alternatively than a alleged politicized organization. Here, there are parallels to the politically charged Cold War era. What was the chief aim of politics then? To defeat the russian Union. However, this period of politicization will yet reappear due to the times we live in. Core tenets of NATO policy, specified as the existence of ISIS as a threat or the fact that climate change is an issue, have been universally accepted in fresh years. Thus, reaching consensus on specified ideas has been comparatively simple.

Yet present we are surviving in a different era for 2 reasons. First, Hungary is among the many tiny states attempting to warrant security. We make an effort to increase defence spending due to the fact that we think that having a potent military of our own helps to deter our geopolitical rivals, including Russia. Prior to 2010, Hungary’s defence budget accounted for little than 1 per cent of the country’s GDP. Today, we are on the right path. However, due to that – and this is not limited to Hungary, it affects many another European NATO members as well – if you begin to spend more on defence, it goes without saying that you would want to see your country’s interests represented in any kind of organization, and NATO is no different.

Thus, the final point I want to make is related to the erstwhile one, which is that Hungary prioritizes economical stableness above all else. Whether we like it or not, Fidesz has become alternatively adept at winning elections, and specified predictability has been key for the markets. Therefore, political stableness and credibility are required for economical stability. And for that reason, following 2010, the Hungarian army began to modernize. The military reserve strategy is 1 specified example. Hungary boasted the second-best example of expanding reserve forces in Europe, not as large as in the case of Finland, but inactive to a crucial level. expanding the reserve forces was 1 of the crucial topics of discussion even before joining NATO. In 2016, Hungary started a multi-year acquisition programme to procure modern equipment for the land forces and the air force. Last year, about 40 per cent of the Hungarian defence budget was related to R&D and innovation, which is double the NATO requirement.

However, there is simply a crucial difference between the army modernization programmes in respective another associate states and Hungary. We are not doing it due to the fact that Washington asks for it, or due to any abstract notion of solidarity. We take this action due to the fact that we think that reforms in the national defence sector are critical to our own security. Furthermore, it goes without saying that we are talking about a multinational strategy, due to the fact that we realize NATO works best through effective global cooperation. Hungary might have a bit of a different position than others, but this is besides 1 way to contribute to the success of NATO.

This commentary is the consequence of a peculiar seminar held May 21st 2024, co-organized by fresh east Europe, LSE IDEAS CSEEP at the Jagiellonian University, and the East European Council. Co-funding is provided by NATO Public Diplomacy.

Péter Stepper is an associate prof. at Ludovika University of Public Service and an external fellow of the Hungarian Institute of global Affairs.