Seven countries from Central and east Europe have been analysed in a series of IRI policy reports on abroad information manipulation and interference (FIMI) under the Beacon Project description which ended in September 2024. The 7 countries are distinct cases which have been impacted by FIMI, yet they have a lot in common not least due to the fact that all of them have been targeted by Russian malign actions to a degree or another, or instrumentalized to task FIMI toward “strategic enemies” (see the case of Macedonia which became the hub for FIMI against US in the 2016 presidential race).
The analysis in these reports stops 3 months before this review is written, thus it can be affirmed that they are up to date, but in any cases TTPs (tactics, techniques and procedures) change so fast that 2 or 3 months after the publishing of the reports the situation could look (even) radically different. specified is the case of the Romanian study which could not foresee the political, electoral and constitutional crisis which occurred in late November and was caused seemingly by a malign interference from both interior (primarily) and Russian sources. With all the above, we would propose to any researcher, expert, analyst and informed reader to start their investigation and processing of the reports with the case of Ukraine, and not Romania then proceed further on with the Estonian report, then the ones on Poland, Romania, Czechia, Slovakia and end up with North Macedonia. specified a series would offer a position from the most intricate FIMI battleground, through the most secured to the least prepared ones.
The study on Ukraine is the most thoroughly written while following an analytical matrix imposed by IRI comprising and introduction into FIMI problematics regarding the national specifics, timeline of subject related events, institutional-legal and regulatory-prescriptive setting developed to tackle FIMI and the function of these institutions, evolution and dynamics of FIMI including topical narratives, outlook and recommendations. fundamentally all the 7 reports include variations of this structure, evidently respecting the country specifics, as all country is unique in this regard, having adopted different approaches and timeframes to fighting this kind of threats, while any having lagged behind in terms of organization layout improvement and social awareness about FIMI. Thus, while FIMI is simply a long word message of intentions from hostile external actors it has not impacted equally strong all the 7 countries, respectively there have been different perceptions about FIMI and organization reactions to it.
Why should Ukraine service as the starting report? due to the fact that if there is 1 country that stands out in this cycle of reports then it is Ukraine. Ukraine has been building an organization framework to combat FIMI since 2014 erstwhile it was first attacked by Russia both kinetically and through active measures, having proved to become the spearhead on the European continent to fighting against Russian-originated and sponsored FIMI. In the case of Ukraine, FIMI went hand and hand with kinetic actions by Russia, not least the annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas, and later in a full-scale war starting in February 2022. Although inconsistencies be between institutions with akin occupation descriptions, and the authors of the study point to the wanting coherence within the plethora of institutions and legislative norms, Ukraine has achieved a certain degree of synergy in this regard, adequate to be presented as an example of efficient fight against Russian FIMI together with the kinetic fight. The study describing FIMI in Ukraine might very well represent the fight of next day (3-5 years) in many if not all of the countries on the east Flank.
One takeaway that singles out Ukraine as the agenda setter of the fight against FIMI on a global level is the thought of organizing an “Information Ramstein”. The thought about an “Information Ramstein” has not yet come to fruition, but the fact that it is an initiative launched by Ukraine, backed by a rich experience of fighting FIMI in the zero line, is not a random fact. The study does talk about the necessity to organize specified a reunion with both an incumbent and preventative scope, 1 reason being FIMI originating against mark countries first and foremost in Russia, and only occasionally or more seldom in China, Belarus or elsewhere.
The next in line of the IRI reports on FIMI would be Estonia and that would be for 1 reason: Estonia is simply a case of organization efficiency and discipline. What singles out Estonia in this scenery is the early awareness about FIMI (at least since 2007, as a consequence of the Soviet Hero monument attack) and the media and information literacy program on a wide educational scale. Otherwise put, Estonia is the example to be inspired from in terms of education, both on the level of bureaucracy and population at large, and StratCom infrastructure. Estonia, as the study conveys, is an eloquent example in how strategical communication should be organized throughout all the executive institutions. A quote from the study would be of use: “Each ministry and state agency in Estonia has at least 1 authoritative who has undergone training in and is tasked with circumstantial responsibilities pertaining to strategical communication within the purview of that organisation.”
Interestingly enough, Estonia has been fighting FIMI long before the word came into usage even given the case of Ukraine, which was forced into a massive improvement in order to combat FIMI erstwhile it felt it went hand in hand with the existential threat of a massive hot war. Estonia, while being besides inspired by well-informed reflection of the creeping then open invasion in Ukraine, came to the following key experience based conclusions: “The experience of Estonia demonstrates that 3 factors are indispensable for resilience against FIMI. Firstly, there must be the formulation and implementation of strategical communications in accordance with a robust national framework of structural documents. Secondly, an environment must be created that safeguards the autonomy of the media. Thirdly, public assurance in democratic processes and state institutions must be preserved.”
These takeaways, together with the organization experience and eco-systemic resilience built by Ukraine, could service as a guidance trio to check the descriptive content expressed in the remainder of the reports. This brings us to the next report, on Poland. What is notable in this study is the equalling of FIMI to the long-time known word and category of “active measures”. Throughout the study 1 of the main threads is that Poland has developed resilience not so much and not exclusively due to the organization and regulatory strategy as to the non-state sector. In another words, Poland does remind to a certain degree the Estonian case, due to its wide network of civic organizations, academia and public space in general. This implicitly drives at the social educational ecosystem which does not necessarily request a rigid regulatory framework to build resilience, but knowledge, access to it on a wide scale and vehicles for this cognition to be spread. 1 could argue that there is besides a supplementary factor, implied but not explicitly mentioned, that of identity which is telling about awareness of constant external threats. In another words, erstwhile there is advanced awareness about FIMI as a “Russian threat” on a wide scale, the Polish society acquires a way of its own to build resilience against this threat through media activism, civilian society organizations, academia and not least state institutions. It goes without saying that the Polish case is not different from the Estonian and Ukrainian ones.
The remaining reports dwell on cases which could be interpreted as building insufficient resilience to combating FIMI. The study on Romania should be treated with a bit of scepticism for the simple reason that what happened in November and December 2024 around the presidential and parliamentary elections in Romania might be a case of FIMI only in appearance. We request much more structured investigations, yet for the time being we can speculate that the Romanian case might have been an inside job[1] – DIMI, that is home Information Manipulation and Interference – which at a certain point had lost control over itself and became part of a FIMI operation. Although, clearly the structure of the study was dictated by the IRI matrix of analysis, the authors of the study on Romania should besides search the consequence to the question whether the nature of the Romanian ruling class could be a structural hindrance to the way the state functions and whether the organization setting for combatting FIMI is an empty shell on the background of oligarchic capture. In another words, are the ubiquitous Romanian secret services (there are six specified institutions in Romania) a structural origin which divert our attention from FIMI toward something that inactive does not have a widely accepted word and knowing overall.
Somewhat misleadingly, given the size and backing of the intelligence and safety apparatus in Romania (approx. 1 per cent of GDP), the country should be a leader in combating FIMI and a bulwark in front of Russian active measures. However, as the authors point out, the main guiding paper and institution – the safety strategy of Romania, together with the ultimate Defence Council – have been behind a meta-narrative in the domain and/or a reactive instrument, and not a builder of policies to tackle FIMI per se. Another central institution to tackle FIMI has been the National Audio-Visual Council, which is indicative about a comparatively narrow knowing of what FIMI may be, unlike in another countries in the IRI list, vide Ukraine, Estonia and Poland.
The remaining 3 reports (on Czechia, Slovakia and North Macedonia) could be lumped together in a subgroup from the point of view of a little resilient organization setting for combating FIMI, at least strictly judging by the description of the regulatory strategy aiming FIMI. What is nevertheless notable are the references to the EU Digital Service Act and Cybersecurity Act as a guiding rule for developing institutions and regulations in this sense. It clearly specifies that efficiency in combating FIMI cannot accomplish by being a stand-alone actor. As the study on Czechia cogently indicates, for actors with lesser organization resources, the EU Digital Service Act is simply a mandatory umbrella against FIMI:
“At the global level, while the EU has established regulations specified as the Digital Services Act and Cybersecurity Act, the coordination between associate states is inactive lacking. FIMI, by nature, transcends borders, and yet national-level responses stay fragmented. The EU could improve mechanisms for the real-time exchange of intelligence on FIMI operations and foster closer cooperation between cybersecurity agencies, intelligence services, and private platforms. Without a robust strategy for data sharing, joint action, and common support, the effectiveness of EU-wide strategies remains limited.”
As the study on North Macedonia brightly suggests, civilian society is the sector that compensates for weak organization settings in combating FIMI. It should not be treated as a panacea, but it is simply a silver lining to the cognition that the state institutions do not always respond adequately or optimally to insidious manipulations meant to sow chaos within societies.
One possible conclusion from reading the 7 IRI reports is that everyone has something to learn from the other. Fighting (most frequently Russian) FIMI is simply a process of permanent learning and relentless fight against renewed attempts to undermine social fabric and organization resilience of the state. The study on Poland did mention that FIMI is just another way to point towards “active measures”, a word invented 1 century ago by the infamous Cheka. This is simply a very useful observation. Fighting against FIMI is not something new. During the Cold War, full organization ecosystems in the West were dedicated to fighting these types of threats. We just request to refresh, occasionally rebuild, and adapt many of those lessons learned to present reality of information society.
Last, but not least, the IRI reports may propose a follow up effort to build a FIMI efficiency combating index. Evidently a much larger body of investigation is needed, bringing on board many another cases, including from countries that have accumulated experience in the first line of fighting FIMI. Examples include Moldova, Armenia, Georgia or much bigger actors like Germany. All of these countries have had to withstand intensive and extended campaigns of FIMI operations, any (like Germany) having had this experience since the early stages of the Cold War.
This text is part of a peculiar cooperation task between IRI and fresh east Europe which aims to advance awareness of abroad information manipulation and interference in democratic societies.
Oktawian Milewski is simply a political scientist specialising in Central and East European studies. He is presently a Poland resident correspondent for Radio France Internationale, Romanian office.
[1] A fresh investigation by the Snoop.ro portal suggests convincingly adequate that what has happened in Romania in the last 2 months was not part of a FIMI campaign, but an inside occupation with the direct participation of people connected to Romanian secret services through the second biggest systemic organization at the time, National Liberal organization (PNL). For more see: https://snoop.ro/anaf-a-descoperit-ca-pnl-a-platit-o-campanie-care-l-a-promovat-masiv-pe-calin-georgescu-pe-tiktok/
