The Russian disinformation apparatus has temporarily limited its activities aimed at portraying Poland as a “threat” to Belarus and Russia. Instead, Moscow has concentrated (in relation to Poland) on commenting on the crisis in Polish-Ukrainian relations. Moscow follows not only the Polish but, besides the Ukrainian infosphere by selecting favourable messages and publications from its position and utilizing them for propaganda purposes and manipulating them or exaggerating their significance. The Russian side uses a maneuver already well-known from its erstwhile activities, namely publishing exaggerated conclusions that intensify negative public emotions.
At present, the Russians are trying to present a favourable situation from their position and expected to lead to extremist changes with lasting consequences. This manifests itself through the exaggeration of messages and the overinterpretation of events, which creates the impression that Poland will shortly permanently turn its back on Kyiv. Russian disinformation centres focus on presenting the dispute as “proof” that the “Polish-Ukrainian alliance” has yet ended and that the state of relations between Kyiv and Warsaw can be described as a “trade war”.
Among another things, the Russians utilized the words of the president of Poland in the context of the UN session, which were manipulated by the Russians to reenforce their message. The message of the president of the Republic of Poland (quote: “The situation resembles dealing with a drowning person. We are the 1 who rescues. Anyone who has always taken part in the rescue of a drowning individual or anyone who has always read about what happens in specified a situation knows that a drowning individual is highly dangerous due to the fact that they can pull you down with them into the depths.”) was cut short and portrayed as words that were “extremely insulting” to Ukrainians and Volodymyr Zelenskyy.
Similarly, the Russians usage posts appearing in the Polish infosphere that stimulate negative emotions towards Ukraine and Ukrainians. As 1 example, we can mention Lukasz Warzecha’s post, which was utilized by both Russian and Belarusian sources (quote: “I have 1 sincere request to my independently reasoning observers: do not be fooled by this abrupt surge of realism of power in relations with Ukraine. It is they who have let us into this trap, placing Poland in the position of an unconditional giver of everything Kyiv wishes for”). As a second example, we can point to the actions of the “Confederation” party, specified as “issuing a bill” to Ukraine for the aid conferred. From Moscow’s perspective, all of these factors are beneficial as they lend credence to the communicative of a “critical level” of Polish-Ukrainian relations.
On the night of 20 September 2023, the Russians besides actively commented on Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki’s message (communiqué from the Prime Minister’s Office), who said that: “Ukraine is defending itself against a bestial Russian attack and I full realize that; however, as I said, we will defend our country. We are no longer transferring arms to Ukraine due to the fact that we are now arming Poland.” This message was manipulated by the Russian side by showing only its fragment and assigning a convenient (manipulated) explanation to it – presenting it as “proof” that Poland has turned its back on Kyiv (and will, in future, block military support flowing from the West through Polish territory).
Russian disinformation centres proceed to monitor the Polish and Ukrainian infosphere by searching for factors that could be utilized to amplify the negative emotions arising from the crisis. The Russians are trying to broadcast 2 lines of messages simultaneously. On the 1 hand, they blame the Polish side for the crisis, while on the other, they blame Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his entourage. This is no accident. The first line serves to deconstruct the affirmative image of Poland in Ukraine (creating Poland as the “traitor”, the organization which delivered the “stab in the back”). The second line serves to stimulate an increase in dislike of Zelenskyy in Ukraine (an effort to influence the electoral preferences of Ukrainians in order to destabilise the political situation in the country). In addition, the Russians are attempting to usage the situation to influence their own audience (the communicative of the imminent end of Ukraine as a consequence of Warsaw turning its back on Kyiv). The Russians are besides seeking to heighten emotions in Poland through the activities of pro-Russian circles and Russian Polish-language sources. Appropriate messages (from Moscow’s perspective) are besides being broadcast to prosecute external objectives (transferring the communicative to the West, Africa and Asia). Given this background, we can anticipate the Russians to launch a massive run aimed at refreshing the communicative of “Polish plans to seize western Ukraine”, which will service to demonise Poland – this communicative may one more time resonate in Russian sources influencing key regions of the world. presently (21 September 2023, morning hours), the Russian side has begun straight lobbying the said narrative, which portrays Poland as “the top threat to Ukraine” (e.g., a message by Russian Duma Deputy, Mikhail Sheremet).
The situation is favourable from Moscow’s perspective, among another things, due to the fact that it fuels antagonism and undermines the sense of close relations between Kyiv and Warsaw (especially in the defence sphere). In the given context, the Russians may effort to convince the Poles that it is essential to reorient their policy and decision towards Russia according to the regulation “better to deal with Moscow” than to “have an uncertain alliance with ungrateful Ukraine”. The Russian side is likely to search to spread views in Poland that undermine the common interests of Poland and Ukraine regarding strategical objectives (the safety sphere). Despite the current crisis, it is worth remembering that Poles and Ukrainians are united by a common interest – the request to defend themselves against the Kremlin’s aggressive policy.
In addition to focusing on the above narrative, the Russian side is devoting a serious part of its attention to what is happening in the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Moscow is trying to usage the situation to strike at the image of Nikola Pashinyan by branding him the “culprit for the defeat” in the clash with Azerbaijan. Moscow is attempting to stoke anti-government sentiment to make conditions in which a pro-Russian politician takes over the country’s reins. At the same time, Moscow seeks to represent Russian “peacekeepers” as the only force that can bring peace and stableness to regions active in armed conflict. This is part of the efforts to build the image of the Russian Federation as the force without which armed conflicts in the post-Soviet area cannot be regulated. Under this narrative, there is simply a request for dialogue/agreement with Moscow on peace-making in Ukraine.
Autor: dr Michał Marek
Public task financed by the Ministry of abroad Affairs of the Republic of Poland within thegrant comp etition “Public Diplomacy 2023”
