The years 2025 and early 2026 have confirmed that the global order based on liberal multilateralism is undergoing a phase of profound erosion. The mechanisms that for decades stabilized relations between states—the primacy of global institutions, the predictability of alliances, and the normative power of the West—are increasingly yielding to the logic of large power competition and the politics of fait accompli. In this sense, we are not witnessing a momentary crisis, but alternatively a process of the structural transformation of the global order.
The return of realism as the dominant analytical position does not, however, signify a simple regression to the 19th-century performance of powers. Contemporary large power position is no longer exclusively a function of military strength or economical potential. Technological, informational, and normative factors are playing an increasingly crucial role—from artificial intelligence and control over data to the ability to form narratives and destabilize adversaries’ societies. Consequently, systemic rivalry is assuming forms that are little visible yet possibly equally destructive.
In conversation with prof. Agata Włodkowska, we examine how the West found itself on the defensive in the face of this fresh multipolarity, and what strategical errors have contributed to the weakening of its position. We besides analyse whether the present minute signifies the enduring twilight of the liberal order or alternatively its painful reconfiguration. Ukraine occupies a peculiar place in this reflection—a state that has become 1 of the chief investigating grounds for the future of European safety and the meaning of western integration.
IGNACY GRZELAK: What sparked your interest in questions of large power politics and rivalry, as well as Poland and Europe’s security?
AGATA WŁODKOWSKA: My choice of global relations was very deliberate and stemmed from my passions developed during secondary school. I was greatly influenced by lecturers specified as prof. Bieleń and prof. Zięba, as well as by the global situation of the late 1990s. My master’s thesis afraid Polish-Russian relations, which revealed to me how hard the relations between a medium-sized state and a large power can be. Over time, at my supervisor’s suggestion, I narrowed my investigation to focus on Russia’s large power position in the CIS region, and later expanded this to include analysis of global and regional rivalry.
Does your investigation propose that a large power strategy is the default state of global relations, from which there is no escape?
Yes, a large power strategy is the natural state, due to the fact that states strive to strengthen their power and influence. Since antiquity, we have observed the cyclical pattern of the emergence and fall of large powers, which consequence from conflicts and the ambitions of fresh players. Currently, modern technologies constitute a fresh field of rivalry, where China is becoming a challenge to the power of the United States and the West.
Are we surviving at a turning point where the era of western dominance is ending?
We are decidedly surviving in a minute of crisis and inevitable transformation of the order. We are observing the comparative weakening of the position of the United States and Europe in favour of Asia—India, China and Indonesia—as well as the increasing importance of formats specified as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Moreover, liberal democracy is losing its appeal in favour of “sovereign democracies” or hybrid models. The West must redefine itself, which is made more hard by interior divisions, populism, and threats from artificial intelligence and Russian disinformation.
It is frequently said that past does not repeat itself, but it rhymes. Does the current division into blocs match those from the past?
History indeed rhymes, and these analogies, for instance, to the period before the Second planet War, supply us with valuable insights. However, the context is different: we have globalization, which makes the complete isolation of blocs difficult, and technologies specified as drones and AI that mark civilians through disinformation. A key difference is the function of China, which operates with tremendous patience, strengthening its economical influence in Africa and Latin America. Today’s multipolarity besides creates thematic blocs based on economical interests, which complicate the image of the world.
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Has the West made strategical errors that have led to this weakening?
Yes. 1 mistake was an excessive belief in the “end of history” and the universality of democracy. Another was the forcible imposition of democracy, for example in Iraq, based on falsified information about weapons of mass destruction. This weakened the credibility and soft power of the West, exposing its hypocrisy regarding global law. another weakening factors include the 2008 crisis, the weak consequence to the annexation of Crimea, Brexit, and Donald Trump’s presidency, which undermined allies’ trust.
How do democratic values appear in this arrangement?
These values are under tremendous external and interior pressure. Europe’s chance to “awaken” lies in shocks: the Russian aggression of 2022 and Trump’s second term. These events are forcing Europeans to take work for their own security, alternatively than relying exclusively on the American umbrella.
Let us turn to Ukraine. Is the script of its entry into the European Union by the end of the decade realistic?
This is simply a very ambitious scenario, but not unrealistic. The way will be bumpy, as Ukraine must adapt to EU standards in conditions of war or reconstruction. We must besides remember that after accession, Poland and Ukraine will become competitors regarding EU funds and agriculture. As for NATO, obtaining safety guarantees may make actual membership little of a precedence for allies reluctant to take risks. For Russia, a democratic and prosperous Ukraine represents an existential challenge that could weaken support for the Kremlin regime.
Do the events from the fresh planet economical Forum in Davos uncover any premises confirming the direction of global political improvement that we are discussing here? Was any speech peculiarly symptomatic for you?
The gathering in Davos confirms the end of the planet order as we know it and the necessity for Europe to “awaken” in order to strengthen its autonomy and power. Regarding the second part of your question, since medium-sized states fall within my investigation interests, my attention focused on the speech by Canada’s prime minister, Marc Carney. He noted that the rules-based order (largely established by the West) is eroding, which means that medium-ranked states specified as Poland can no longer feel comparatively secure. He besides emphasized that medium-sized states should not stay passive, and surely should not act alone, but alternatively should jointly strengthen their own agency with another states of this rank and actively engage in the global game, while simultaneously being able to withstand force from large powers.
This conversation with prof. Włodkowska demonstrates that contemporary large power politics has not only regained central importance but is besides increasingly shaping the norms according to which the full global strategy functions. This signifies a departure from the logic of predictable rules toward a variable game of interests, in which trust becomes a scarce resource and stableness a fragile and conditional value. For medium-sized and smaller states specified as Ukraine and Poland, this transformation carries fundamental consequences. Ukraine’s accession to the European Union is not simply a developmental task but besides a civilizational and geopolitical decision—an effort to permanently exit the Russian sphere of influence and anchor itself in an order that, despite its own weaknesses, inactive offers greater predictability than alternate models of order. At the same time, this process will be neither swift nor free from tensions—including within the Union itself.
Ultimately, the stakes affect not only the future of 1 state but besides the answer to the question of whether Europe and the West more broadly are capable of strategical “awakening” and redefining their function in the world. In conditions of intensifying systemic rivalry, it is no longer adequate to invoke past narratives about the universality of values. It becomes essential to combine norms with the real capacity to defend them—politically, technologically, and socially. It is precisely in this space that the future form of the global order will be determined.
Agata Włodkowska is simply a prof. at Vistula University, where she conducts investigation in the field of global relations in the post-Soviet area, the abroad policy of Poland and Russia, and the explanation of abroad policy and global relations. The issue of sex in global politics besides plays an crucial function in her research. She is simply a associate of the Polish Political discipline Association and the author of many publications on large power politics.
Ignacy Grzelak is simply a third-year student in global Relations at the Vistula University. He is curious in the sociological aspects of politics, investigation on the future of the global order, and mediate east affairs. He has completed internships at the Heinrich Böll Foundation in Warsaw and the Centre for global Relations think tank.