Lithuanian abroad policy has been dominated by 2 separate and distinct camps for any time: those driven by principles and values, and the rational pragmatists. Of course, there is simply a 3rd camp whose supporters believe that Lithuania should return to the Russian sphere of influence. As of today, this 3rd option makes up a 3rd of the governing coalition.
Both the value-oriented and pragmatic camps agree on the country’s overall direction – Lithuania should follow the pro-western, pro-European and pro-democratic improvement path. Both support and positively view the country’s membership in the EU and NATO. What then is the difference between the supporters of values and the pragmatists?
The biggest differences appear erstwhile the discussion deals with the approaches to abroad policy and Lithuania’s position regarding geopolitical events. The value-based wing calls for active participation in the east Partnership, opposition to anti-democratic moves in another parts of the world, and a strong position erstwhile it comes to China.
The pragmatists agree with many of these goals and the overall improvement direction. However, for respective decades they have besides called for Lithuania to opt for a more careful position. This means following the leadership of another countries and more calculations concerning risks and costs.
Perhaps the most crucial example of the erstwhile word was the issue of Taiwan. While the values supported by the conservatives and any liberals would lead to an open conflict with China, the another side was becoming tangibly anxious. The presidential administration was not against the thought of beginning a typical office of Taiwan in Lithuania in the beginning. However, erstwhile Nausėda’s people began to gauge the possible reaction of the Chinese government they gradually withdrew their support for specified an idea. Later they would display a direct and open indignation at the callus (or arrogant) attitude of the government.
The difference between these 2 camps besides became clearer following the events in Georgia. The “hawks” of the value-based grouping, led by Žygimantas Pavilionis, would call from their opposition position for active participation in expressing support for the ousted president Salome Zurabishvili and the protesters in Georgian society. On the another side, there is simply a desire to balance the support shown, taking into account the reactions of another partners.
Discussing his work as abroad minister, in an LRT interview, the erstwhile advisor to the president Kęstutis Budrys stressed that it is essential to support Georgian aspirations to become a part of the European Union. He besides said that the election results and the suppression of protests in Tbilisi are worrying, but that we should not interfere in the interior processes of another countries.
This message would sound logical if we accept the premise that abroad policy and the relations it brings with it are not a direct continuation of interior politics. home politics inevitably shapes abroad policy. In order to change that situation, there is usually a request to influence the interior politics of another countries. It is not without reason that large modern thinkers and historians specified as Niall Ferguson and Stephen Kotkin underline that the biggest mistake the West made erstwhile faced by the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine was the weak attempts to act against authoritarian regimes within its own borders. besides small support is given to (not necessarily) democratic oppositions and besides small appreciation is given to the anticipation that home political processes can easy overthrow regimes that effort to appear stone solid and indestructible. This chance was seen during the rebellion of Yevgeny Prigozhin, who was halted only by the fact that he had no cognition of how to proceed after he successfully led his Wagnerite goons towards Moscow.
This is simply a mistake that western countries proceed to make in the area of the east Partnership. While there is simply a practice of average non-intervention and condemnations, Russia, China and another anti-democratic states do everything in their power to influence elections and corrupt or force possible political leaders. This process is ongoing, with attempts besides being made to influence election results within these western countries themselves.
The only way to save countries like Moldova and Georga from a Belarusian script is (or was) an active interference in their interior politics and the bold support of democratic leaders. This position raises many questions for this newfound position of rational pragmatism that is appearing in Lithuanian abroad policy and is seemingly increasing in popularity. “We will not jump the gun,” “foreign policy will not be shaped by paper headlines” – this is how the president and his administration describe the fresh approach of Lithuanian abroad policy.
Such an attitude is not doomed to be ineffective. It requires nevertheless a advanced level of authority, a strong diplomatic corps, crucial investment, and a clear and strategical knowing of what the country plans to accomplish through being careful, rational and pragmatic erstwhile acting to strengthen democracy.
As of now, 1 must admit that the authority of the fresh leaders of Lithuanian abroad policy is not very strong in Europe.
Not even the shadow of the president looming in the background is helping. Nausėda, during his first word in office, turned out to be nothing more than a steady looking traveller going to different meetings and repeating opinions from the position of a commentator. It must be said that all of the presidential initiatives were either borrowed or reformatted common European ideas. There was a deficiency of individual leadership or initiatives that were aimed at uniting leaders in the region or continent over a circumstantial issue. There were no concrete strategies or plans, and there is nothing that tells us this could change now. Lithuania inactive is simply a solid associate that listens and agrees. However, it cannot hope to scope its own goals without stepping out by itself.
So, the rational pragmatists promise another approach where the goals become very unclear. What will we look for in the thought of the east Partnership? What if we admit the illegitimate government and president in Georgia? Will we support the opposition forces? If yes, what mechanisms will be employed to accomplish specified a result, another than resolutions and projections of indignations?
How will we aid Ukraine in its aspirations of EU membership? How will we explain our decisions that let for commercial entities to gain from military exports to 3rd countries, which leads to different spare parts uncovering their way to Russia?
What will our position be towards the United States of America if a fresh Trump administration proposes a peace plan equalling a capitulation with no benefits for Ukraine? Will we condemn it? Or possibly we would support it, afraid of our own destiny in the global game of planet powers?
How can we prevent the Hungarian and Slovak sabotage of the sanctions government against Russia? What would we do if Russia employed a maneuver of terrorist attacks on our critical infrastructure and power lines?
The position of the value-based camp in these matters has sometimes been desperately bold, sometimes foolhardy, sometimes unwise, but at least clear cut. What does this fresh approach entail? Where are the goals and benefits of our pragmatic position?
For now, we can say that the fresh approach to Lithuanian abroad policy will be calmer, more careful and based on the private deliberations of the president with a fewer another political leaders in the region. In any case, there will be more of an alignment than a leading role.
Yes, this means taking little risks, with less opportunities to get burnt compared to operating above the country’s weight class or facing another unforeseen conditions along the way. But it besides means less possibilities to influence the opinions of another countries and less chances to change the geopolitical environment. It besides means less options to aid nations which might be late, but inactive desire to follow the way to democracy.
Many observers almost agree in unison that the last fewer years have proven crucial erstwhile it comes to the context of geopolitical shakeups and attempts to hold influence. Authoritarian regimes and local radicals are challenging the democracies in our countries. They question the thought of global agreements, human rights and freedom. What then is possible in specified a situation – the opportunism of values or rational pragmatism? This is an open question that not only does not unite but leads to even bigger differences in our discussions about abroad policy.
This text was republished through the partnership between fresh east Europe and LRT English.
Translated from Lithuanian by Nikodem Szczygłowski.
Paulius Gritėnas is simply a philosopher and commentator at LRT.
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