Major changes are expected in the Czech Republic following the elections to the Chamber of Deputies, which took place on the first weekend of October 2025. A fresh majority was immediately formed from the erstwhile opposition, led by erstwhile prime minister and oligarch Andrej Babiš, who was tasked by president Petr Pavel with forming a fresh government. Babiš’s ANO movement is complemented by the far-right SPD (Freedom and Direct Democracy) and the fresh organization Motorists for Themselves, which defers to erstwhile president Václav Klaus and positions itself as a right-wing force with an emphasis on ideological conservatism and economical liberalism.
Together, they are now announcing a major shift distant from Petr Fiala’s current policy, which could besides affect Czech support for Ukraine. During his campaign, Babiš himself questioned the Czech ammunition initiative, under which Ukraine could receive as many as 1.8 million pieces of artillery ammunition this year alone. In addition, he repeatedly stated that the Czech Republic would no longer give Ukraine a single crown from its arms budget and regularly attacked Ukrainian refugees. However, the organization with the most hardline attitude towards Ukraine is Tomio Okamura’s SPD, who was elected to chair the Chamber of Deputies and immediately ordered the Ukrainian flag to be removed from the parliament building.
The backdrop to the elections and anti-Ukrainian rhetoric was the Czech economical crisis following the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which Fiala’s government was incapable to control. Like another countries, the Czech Republic struggled with advanced inflation. Real wages inactive have not reached pre-pandemic levels, and GDP in 2019 was not equalized until 2024. As a result, life for the average Czech has become very expensive, and Andrej Babiš focused heavy on home and economical issues in his campaign. He treated abroad policy and safety issues as secondary, and they were fundamentally viewed through the prism of the economy and home problems. Hence the statements that the Czech Republic would no longer supply money from its budget for weapons for Ukraine, or the questioning of the acquisition of American F-35 fighter jets as besides expensive. In this context, the rhetoric that Ukraine should be supported at the NATO level and not from the Czech budget is besides very characteristic, showing that Babiš has no problem with supporting Ukraine as such.
This trend is reflected in the proposed coalition programme, which was published in early November. It is simply a very general document, with a clear precedence on home issues and an emphasis on populist handouts and expanding wages in the public sector. Interestingly, the coalition programme is clearly mostly subordinate to the programme of the ANO movement, which, with 80 MPs out of a full of 200, will dominate parliament.
Although coalition partners are expected to receive plenty of positions in the recently formed government, the coalition’s programme includes only a minimum of their demands. This is very evident in the case of the Motorists’ Party, whose programme included taxation cuts, striving for a balanced budget and, in general, minimal state interference in the economy, which is clearly at odds with ANO’s very generous programme. Similarly, the SPD organization is theoretically set to receive 3 ministries. In reality, however, the ministers will be “experts” chosen by Babiš himself, and not members of the party.
If there is anything else in the coalition’s full programme and rhetoric too the economy, it is an emphasis on national sovereignty, opposition to migration, green policies and non-governmental organizations, i.e. rhetoric characteristic of the far right. civilian society’s fears of attempts at regulation are so not unfounded. 1 of the victims to this may fall the abroad ministry’s programme of transformational support. Thanks to this programme, Czech non-governmental organizations have been working for many years in east Europe, South Caucasus and another regions to advance the democratization of local societies.
Behind this rhetoric, of course, lies a large deal of distance from any EU policies, which have long been treated as a scapegoat in the Czech Republic, including by a large part of the erstwhile coalition led by Petr Fiala. And although the SPD was forced to abandon its most extremist demands, specified as a referendum on leaving the EU and NATO, the coalition programme explicitly states that “the European Union has its limitations.” Regardless of the fact that any of these steps will most likely find allies across Europe as the temper changes, even among the leaders of the largest EU countries, the Czech government is likely to be marginalized within the EU. This will besides be facilitated by the fact that the coalition parties are members of the number and utmost European factions of Patriots for Europe and Europe of Sovereign Nations.
A characteristic feature of the section of the coalition programme devoted to abroad policy is the strong emphasis on economical diplomacy and “pragmatism”. This explicitly mentions maintaining good relations with neighbours and Israel, which is simply a Czech tradition, and strengthening the partnership with the US. In addition, the government besides wants to keep “good or at least average relations” with another planet powers, which can be interpreted as a motion primarily to China.
The election run already placed considerable emphasis on regional cooperation and, first and foremost, on rebuilding the Visegrad Group. This reflects the long-standing orientation of the coalition partners, led by Babiš himself, towards an alliance with politicians specified as Viktor Orbán. Equally characteristic is the mention to Donald Trump’s current US administration. However, this is where a certain problem arises. As part of his “anti-war” rhetoric, Babiš is opposed to a extremist increase in defence spending and has questioned the acquisition of F-35 aircraft for the Czech army. Therefore, the fresh Czech government will most likely only imitate Trump rhetorically and will not become a “model ally” like contemporary Poland.
The composition of the government, Prime Minister Babiš’s interference and the possible for blackmail by coalition partners, mainly the SPD, will besides have a crucial impact on Czech abroad and safety policy. The possible appointment of Filip Turek, a well-known influencer and the main face of the Motorists, as minister of abroad affairs has caused large concern. As a individual with no diplomatic experience and extremist views, he could do quite a few harm to the Czech diplomatic apparatus. This is all the more so due to the fact that even before the elections, there was controversy surrounding him due to his “warm attitude” towards Nazi symbolism. The Motorists are continuing with his nomination, but it is already clear present that he cannot become a minister. After the elections, many scandalous comments by Turek appeared in the media from his social networks, which are full of force and references to the 3rd Reich.
In light of this, the door is now open for individual little controversial with experience in diplomacy. According to media reports, the hitherto little-known diplomat Karel Beran, who was previously ambassador to Spain and Argentina, could become abroad minister, which would bring a small more continuity than the appointment of the extremist Turek.
Importantly, the Czech president Petr Pavel, who is simply a major player on the political scene, is heavy active in these issues and is trying to keep the existing policy framework, mainly in terms of support for Ukraine. On the 1 hand, he had no problem entrusting the winner Babiš with the task of forming a fresh government. At the same time, however, he is powerfully signalling his reservations about figures specified as Filip Turek and the rhetoric of the fresh coalition in general. This was evident, for example, during the independency Day celebrations on October 28th, erstwhile he focused his speech on the importance of civilian society for the country.
The last crucial issue is the fresh Czech government’s policy towards Ukraine and Russia. Andrej Babiš cannot be surely labelled as a pro-Russian politician, but as already mentioned, during the election campaign, the fresh coalition partners utilized anti-Ukrainian rhetoric and promised to limit support. What is very characteristic is that in the proposed coalition programme, the subject of Ukraine is only mentioned briefly, stating that the government “will support diplomatic steps leading to the end of the war”. There is not even a word about Russia.
In this context, however, it should be emphasized that the erstwhile Czech government allocated very small budgetary resources to support Ukraine, and the army has long since had virtually no equipment that it could transfer to Kyiv. Therefore, small is likely to change in these areas. At the same time, it is hard to imagine that Babiš’s government will in any way restrict the activities of the Czech arms industry, which is an crucial partner for Ukraine.
Another issue is active support for Ukraine on the global stage, the destiny of Czech engagement in the country’s recovery, and mainly the Czech ammunition initiative. On the 1 hand, Andrej Babiš is improbable to block decisions crucial for Ukraine at the EU level, including those concerning its accession to the community. However, it is already known that Tomáš Kopečný, the government’s envoy for the recovery of Ukraine, who has done quite a few good for Ukraine, is ending his mission. With his resignation, the future of the Czech Republic’s engagement in the recovery of Ukraine, which was not insignificant considering small allocated funds, is now in question. However, Babiš could be persuaded by a certain pragmatism and the fact that these are initiatives that aid Czech businesses that want to get active in Ukraine. It is no coincidence that in a telephone conversation with Volodymyr Zelenskyy shortly after the elections, Babiš’s visit to Kyiv as prime minister in 2019, erstwhile he was accompanied by a large delegation of Czech entrepreneurs, was mentioned. At that time, Babiš spoke very positively about Ukraine as a country full of business opportunities.
Even before the elections, Andrej Babiš signalled his strongest opposition to the allegedly “non-transparent” Czech ammunition initiative. Paradoxically, from what is known, it is not the initiative itself that is an obstacle for Babiš, but his individual dislike of Michal Strnad, the owner of the largest Czech arms company Czechoslovak Group. Strnad profits from the initiative and has become so wealthy from the war in Ukraine that, at the age of 33, he has become the richest Czech overall, surpassing even the fresh prime minister. In this regard, however, strong force can be seen from president Pavel, who wants to keep the initiative alive. Even if it were to be abandoned by the fresh government, small would change for Ukraine, as there are already countries willing to take over the programme. This of course would mean a failure of reputation for the Czech Republic.
In summary, it is evident that the abroad policy of Andrej Babiš’s government will be mostly subordinated to interior needs and will not play as crucial a function as it has done so far. The Czech Republic will most likely be sidelined in the EU, and the government will focus more on allies specified as Viktor Orbán and Donald Trump. At the same time, it should be remembered that Andrej Babiš will not want to stay completely isolated and will search contact with major players on the global stage, as this is something he personally enjoys and his voters appreciate. Previously, for example, he frequently boasted that French president Emmanuel Macron was his friend.
When it comes to Ukraine and the war itself, Babiš would most likely be most happy if he simply did not gotta deal with this issue. We can presume that active support for Ukraine will be importantly reduced and that any of the Czech government’s existing activities, including the ammunition initiative, which the president is pushing to continue, will besides be threatened. On the another hand, however, Babiš will most likely not block crucial EU decisions and may “pragmatically” support Czech businesses curious in Ukraine. The biggest question mark at this point is how much force extremist coalition partners, mainly from the SPD, will put on soon-to-be Prime Minister Babiš in specified matters. However, the deficiency of their votes in parliament could be offset by opposition MPs who could support Babiš’s government on any crucial issues.
Michal Lebduška is simply a investigation fellow with AMO, the Prague-based Association for global Affairs. His investigation focuses on politics, safety and society in Ukraine, Poland and Belarus, as well as Ukrainian-Polish relations.
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