Instead, he accidentally helped us build a stronger, united front – a truly formidable “double-sized wall” against aggression. It is now clear that the centre of European safety has shifted to the North-East. Within the Baltic Sea region, there is now clear political resolve and robust military means for deterrence. This transformation, driven by Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO, has fundamentally reshaped the Nordic-Baltic safety scenery and established a vital fresh front line for European defence
For us here in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, the weight of this change feels immediate and immense. Our safety has always been a primary concern within NATO, given our direct proximity to Russia and that famously exposed long of land known as the Suwałki Gap. Now, with Sweden and Finland on board, any of those long-standing strategical dilemmas, the ones that kept us up at night, are yet being tackled head on.
The Baltic Sea is now almost entirely a “NATO lake”. Apart from Russia’s Kaliningrad Oblast and a tiny coastal strip around St Petersburg, virtually all inch of its shoreline belongs to the Alliance. This is not just a map change; it is simply a game-changer for regular life and strategical thinking. NATO’s direct border with Russia in the north has effectively doubled overnight, now extending into the Arctic region with Finland’s lengthy frontier. This dramatically expanded front line means vastly more opportunities for allied forces to manoeuvre, as well as far simpler defence planning. Crucially, it besides provides NATO with the unprecedented chance to control vital maritime routes. This comprehensive control is absolutely vital, especially erstwhile considering the murky “grey zone” threats that have been on the rise.
Indeed, these are not theoretical concerns. For us, they are part of our regular reality. In the past year, we have seen worrying reports of a “shadow fleet” operating in these waters, utilizing a variety of physical and electronic measures to mask their identity (or even effort to hide from authorities entirely), alongside alarming incidents of undersea cable harm right across the Baltic. Just in late May 2025, Finland’s defence minister, Antti Häkkänen, mentioned that fresh developments are now being seen, as Russia has started to defend its shadow fleet in the narrow passage of the Gulf of Finland with military escorts and the wider presence of armed forces. This new, aggressive posture follows fresh events like suspected Russian airspace violations in Finnish territory. Estonian patrols have besides been actively inspecting suspicious, uninsured vessels, leading to tense encounters, including a standoff in May where a Russian fighter aircraft reportedly entered Estonian airspace after a tanker refused inspection. These vessels, sometimes changing names multiple times in a substance of months to obscure their identities, item the lengths to which these operations go. A unified NATO presence across this vast fresh maritime front allows for a much more effective, coordinated consequence to these hybrid tactics, shoring up critical infrastructure from Tallinn to Vilnius and defending the fundamental right to freedom of navigation against those who would exploit it. For average citizens, this means a greater sense of safety in the very infrastructure that underpins our modern lives.
This is not just about static defences; it is about dynamic power projection. With Swedish positions and capabilities, peculiarly the strategically vital island of Gotland in the mediate of the Baltic Sea, which is now a NATO asset, the Alliance gains an unprecedented ability to task air and sea power into and across the central Baltic. This fundamentally transforms the ability to receive fast reinforcements, something that weighs heavy on the minds of those who remember a more susceptible past. Furthermore, Finland’s potent ground threat forces Russia to dilute any forces it might otherwise concentrate on the Baltic states, whose fundamental deficiency of strategical depth in terms of land remains a challenge. Sweden and Finland’s accession offers a critical hedge strategy: the collective capabilities now available can effectively shut down the Baltic Sea if necessary. This would affect coordinated naval operations, including possible offensive mining capabilities around key areas like Kaliningrad, ensuring maritime dominance and preventing hostile access.
Sweden and Finland bring serious fresh muscle to NATO’s Northern Flank. Finland, for instance, boasts 1 of Europe’s largest reserve armies and unparalleled expertise in full defence, importantly bolstering NATO’s ground defence. For us in the Baltics, this means any possible Russian ground aggression would now face a more expansive, integrated and incredibly resilient front. It is like having new, incredibly tough neighbours in our corner. This enhanced integration is already evident. Sweden, for example, deployed troops to the Multinational Brigade in Latvia earlier this year. This marks a historical first with Swedish land forces contributing to collective defence on another NATO member’s soil. This is simply a powerful, tangible sign of Stockholm’s immediate commitment to Baltic security, something we profoundly appreciate here.
Beyond the hardware, the courage of these nations’ leaders to decision distant from decades of neutrality simply wipes distant any lingering strategical ambiguity Russia might have tried to exploit. Their unwavering commitment to NATO’s Article 5, the collective defence clause, sends a clear, undeniable message: any aggression against an allied country will be met with the full force of the full Alliance, including the considerable military and intelligence capabilities of Sweden and Finland. This absolute clarity dramatically strengthens deterrence across the region. It is simply a loud and clear “don’t even think about it,” a message that resonates profoundly with our historical experiences.
Crucially, the Baltic states themselves are leading by example, putting our money where our mouths are erstwhile it comes to defence. Lithuania, for instance, has pledged to importantly boost its defence spending to a remarkable 5 to six per cent of GDP from 2026, aiming to become 1 of NATO’s highest per capita defence spenders. Estonia and Latvia are following suit, with Estonia committed to reaching at least 5 per cent of GDP by 2026, and Latvia targeting 5 per cent by 2028. This incredible commitment, coupled with consistent and vocal leadership in stressing safety threats, means the Nordic and Baltic nations are increasingly stepping into a pivotal leadership function within Europe. Our first-hand knowing of geopolitical dynamics and our proactive embrace of NATO integration offer invaluable insights for the full continent. We are at the forefront, pushing for robust deterrence, unwavering support for Ukraine, and comprehensive resilience against all types of hybrid threats. Our collective voice and shared strategical position are now playing a much more central function in shaping Europe’s broader safety agenda.
Ultimately, Sweden and Finland joining NATO is far more than just an expansion: it is simply a fundamental recalibration of power in the Baltic Sea region. This dramatic shift aligns with the desires of key allies, peculiarly the United States, who search a concrete and swift sign of Europe’s transition toward a hard defence posture. Washington will increasingly look to its Nordic, Baltic and Polish partners – nations demonstrating proactive commitment – alternatively than waiting for slower, more painful changes across the broader European core.
While this fresh reality has transformed an area erstwhile fraught with vulnerabilities into a cohesive region of collective strength, forging a actual “New Nordic Shield”, the journey is far from over. For Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia, this fresh reality means importantly enhanced security, far little strategical uncertainty, and the tangible promise of collective defence against any future threats, allowing us to stand firmer than always on NATO’s reinforced east Flank. However, the way ahead requires sustained effort. Beyond the political will and budget plans, there is inactive immense work to be done in developing very concrete military capabilities, ensuring interoperability, and adapting to evolving threats. This fresh chapter demands continuous investment, innovation, and unwavering determination to translate resolve into resilient defence.
Inga Samoškaitė is simply a safety policy analyst specializing in national security, hybrid threats and human security.
