Three years ago, Ukrainian forces retook Kherson in what was then hailed as a major turning point in the war. At the time, prof. Andrey Makarevich, a political scientist at the University of Tartu and long-time observer of Russia’s authoritarian evolution, told me that Vladimir Putin would not last a second Kherson. But that second Kherson never came. Today, with the war dragging on and May 9th one more time upon us, we return to prof. Makarevich for an update—not just on the military situation, but on what 3 years of war have done to Russia’s psyche, its neighbors, and its dictator.
VAZHA TAVBERIDZE: Our last interview was 3 years ago – the Ukrainians had just liberated Kherson and I remember you told me that Putin wouldn’t last a second Kherson. A second Kherson never came though – so how does it look present for Putin?
ANDREY MAKAREVICH: Well, the price that Putin and Russia pay for this war is definitely high. From that perspective, there is not much to be happy about, to celebrate—if you look at Russia’s limited success on the battlefield, and at what cost these successes have come, the tremendous price Russia has to pay for each metre of captured Ukrainian land. Especially if you take into account the correlation of forces—one of the largest armies in the world, during 3 years, cannot accomplish militarily any of the goals and aims it set out initially. So there is no success communicative for Russia here. These 3 years have demonstrated that Russia under Putin was and remains a retro-state that is trying to package its failures and sale them as successes—and the forthcoming May 9th parade is simply a clear example of that. They will effort to sale this crawling advance into Ukraine as a success story, a communicative of consolidating the nation, of Russia that was on its knees rising again, asserting itself. So erstwhile it comes to this propagandistic dimension, you just request to look at how the widows of the slain soldiers and officers are expressing their public gratitude to Putin—for fundamentally taking lives of their loved ones and sending them into the meatgrinder. In this sense, if that is success, he can well celebrate it.
He can effort to sale failure as victory, as success—but are there buyers? And if yes, why? What’s the appeal?
In today’s Russia, the predominant attitude to the war is that—yes, possibly we shouldn’t have started it—but since we did, let’s go till the bitter end. So basically, public opinion is inactive not critical towards the war—and a very crucial section outright supports the war. Even people who live right next to it, in border towns, those who can see and odor and feel this war, even they more like accept the situation alternatively than challenge or revolt or effort to be critical.
What is the temper amongst those that you have dubbed as Homo Putinus in your research, those who support the war? Putin had lost Kursk for months, is having marginal success on the battlefield and can’t even warrant the safety of the sky over Moscow for the parade. How come there isn’t a mob crying that the Tsar has gone bad—we request a better one?
Well, in this sense, I think Russian society is deeply, profoundly sick—psychologically. And this advanced level of support for the war is simply a good sign of that. And I don’t think I know how much time it might take to wake up. Even those who distance themselves from the war effort not to announcement it—that besides can be interpreted as an indirect acceptance. And then there is this death cult and fascination with death, which I was keeping an eye on and tracing for many years. But now this glorification of death has reached its peak—now it’s something qualitatively different even from russian times. Russia lost its sensitivity to death, to the failure of human life; it is no longer taking death seriously. Which is morbid—but besides fascinating.
When did it start?
I fishy that this new, before unseen highest started with COVID-19, erstwhile Russia lost about 1 million people. No 1 noticed that. Almost 1 million people now killed in the war—over 3 years. This kind of insensitivity to death is frankly amazing, and I am not certain that in political discipline we have explanations for that. You request to go to political psychologists. The more we lose, the stronger is our argument. First comes the insensitivity, then the glorification—and now gratitude. Death validates us. The widows are grateful for taking their husbands and brothers to war and getting them killed there in a senseless, absurd war.
Speaking of the parade—if Zelenskyy were to piss on it, metaphorically of course, what could be Putin’s response?
Putin can easy fall victim of his own fetish. And the May 9th for him surely carries that kind of status. If something goes incorrect with his fetish, with this ritual, he won’t be happy—but it’s hard to make forecasts on how far he would be willing to go. He doesn’t have many options left to escalate this war, and at the same time he besides doesn’t want to completely disrupt the communication with the United States. Although, of course, he did many things that displaced Trump, but he inactive wants to keep the door ajar with Americans, even though he doesn’t have the slightest intention to stop. He is full intent on continuing this war anyway, no substance what would happen on May 9th. And the main reason for that is political—because should the war end, the very people you mentioned earlier, the ones not revolting now—they might start asking questions about the price they paid and what they got for it. erstwhile they get to see the bill, so to say.
Another thing that was very apparent in the preparations phase is that the Kremlin was trying to underscore that this global isolation of Russia is ending. With the line-up that arrived in Moscow, can that be said?
The isolation was always limited to the western countries. Putin was not isolated in the Global South. But while any of the leaders are ready to play different pragmatic games with Putin, nobody much wants to be seen as a friend of his. Continuing business as usual with Russia is 1 thing, but going to Moscow and standing next to Putin at an ideology event? That has limited value for people like Modi, for example, who already is getting what he wants from Putin, so there isn’t much point for him to go. We are increasingly surviving in this Trumpist, transactional planet where norms and values mean little and less, and everything’s judged by its material value. So now Putin is 1 of the victims of this Trumpist way of thinking—because people might ask, where are our material benefits for that, for coming to the parade? And I don’t think that he has a clear answer to that.
And finally, let me ask you about the impact of these 3 years of war on Russia’s neighborhood—on what it terms as its close abroad. So let’s look around Russia, and what have these 3 years of war done to its neighborhood?
I think Russia had to endure a couple of very serious blows against its own ambitions. First off, 2 of the countries it never wanted to see in NATO became NATO members. Number two, I think the Eurasian integration received an almost mortal blow as well, due to the fact that after the 24th of February 2022, speaking about Russian-led integration became a farce. A peaceful Eurasian integration task is even little feasible now than it would have been before. It is clear that Russia succeeds on its integration in its own way—by utilizing force and the threat of utilizing force. And it’s a persuasive argument. Just look at Belarus—the key argument of Lukashenka is that, “Guys, whatever you think about me, I kept Belarus peaceful.” Look at our neighboring country again. Look at Georgia. Whatever 1 may think about the Georgian Dream, they capitalized on this fear that Russia can do to Georgia precisely what they did with Mariupol. And this is not fake. So Russia can definitely sale this sense of anxiety, sense of fear—and basically, geopolitical blackmail. If you want peace, if you want to keep your country in its borders, the only way would be to accept our conditions. Look at Ukraine. Look at Georgia—what happened in 2008—minus 20 per cent of their territory. This is simply a very cynical argument, but besides very persuasive.
Gorilla geopolitics. Gunboat diplomacy.
Forget about soft power. Forget about this imitation of European integration in the Eurasian space. They always tried to mimic or borrow whatever the European Union was doing. No—now it’s only fear and threats. And the only question is whether Russia has adequate resources for subjugating a crucial part of the post-Soviet area. I uncertainty that. Even though sanctions are not as effective as we were hoping for. But still, Russia simply doesn’t have adequate resources for that. What Russia most likely will effort to usage is subversive tactics—to effort and bring to power the most pro-Russian forces in the neighboring countries. Especially taking into account that many countries are divided—like Moldova is almost 50/50 on pro-Russian vs western sentiment. In the Baltic states, Russia tries its best, but the pro-Russian forces are marginal. But then again, Alternative für Deutschland was besides considered a marginal force a fewer years ago. Everything is changing—and Russia is steadily investing into the peaceful facilitation of taking power by pro-Russian forces in its neighborhood.
This interview was originally published in Georgian by RFE/RL
Andrey Makarevich is simply a prof. of political discipline at the University of Tartu.
Vazha Tavberidze is simply a Georgian writer and staff author with RFE/RL’s Georgian Service. His writing has been published in various Georgian and global media outlets, including The Times, the Spectator, the Daily Beast and New east Europe.
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