Rosyjskie publikacje dezinformujące dotyczące Polski w okresie powyborczym

infowarfare.pl 1 rok temu

The Russian disinformation apparatus inactive refers to Polish parliamentary elections (post-election period: 16-19 October 2023). However, these actions are not like a massive wave but seem to be a chaotic effort to take advantage of the situation to strengthen its communicative based on manipulation and an overemphasis on the consequences of the election results. Aside from this matter, Russians are gradually reviving erstwhile narratives.

At present, regarding information on the elections, Russia tries to represent Poland as a country that has been “in a state of chaos” and is “completely wrecked”. specified an intention is simply a form of overemphasis utilized to belittle the image of democracy. In this context, Poland is besides shown as a country whose “regime” will be replaced with “slightly little Russophobic people”. Irrespective of the political configuration, Poland is allegedly inactive “extremely hostile” to Russia. specified an impression allows Moscow to keep on convincing Russians that they are “besieged” and that the threat coming from Poland is inactive “serious”.

Parallel to the aforementioned actions, the Russian disinformation apparatus is reviving erstwhile narratives. In this context, it is worth mentioning materials that represent Poland as a country that reportedly intends to invade Ukraine (the annexation of western countries and acquisition of control over the full country). peculiar materials referring to the above-stated communicative are utilized to remind Russians about “Polish aggressive intentions” in relation to their neighbours and about the “secret intrigues of Warsaw” against Ukraine.

In the post-election period, Russians have been very active in devaluing the image of the Polish Army. In specified a vision, Polish soldiers endure from “Polish provocations” that hotel to the common deployment of soldiers in “mouldy” and “louse-infested” areas. Following this narrative, the Ministry of National defence and the government of the Republic of Poland are shown as the structure that does not care about its soldiers and “modernises its army only in theory”. Warsaw appears here as a central unit that ignores the religion of its citizens – the primary goal is said to be “provocation of Moscow” (soldiers” religion is reportedly insignificant to Warsaw). specified a communicative is related to the portrayal of Poland as a country ruled by “extreme Russophobes” and that the Polish army is depicted as profoundly faulty and a formation that may be inclined to “oppose the Russophobic policy of Warsaw”.

Aside from the aforementioned messages, Russian propaganda emphasises the unveiling of Mikhail Muravyov’s monument in the Kaliningrad Oblast. Following “arguments” presented in publications on the “heroic attainments” of the aforesaid person, an emphasis is placed on the fact that he was not liable for panic in Polish lands but attempted to propagate the “Orthodox identity”. It is another example of portraying a individual liable for the suffering and death of thousands of Poles, Lithuanians and Belarusians as a Russian hero – “Orthodox and Russian soul defender”. At this point, it is worth noting that Russian materials concerning the substance in question stress that M. Muravyov’s accomplishment was the fact that he is inactive allegedly a “terror to Polish people”. Publications item that the erection of the monument met/will meet with a negative reaction of Poland – it is expected to be a “value itself”. Erection of the monument in honour of the criminal liable for terrorising civilians residing in areas occupied by Russia is another sign of a cult of violence, crime and imperialism, which is typical of Russian statehood (also modern).