Today, we can affirmatively say that we are entering a fresh phase of the Russo-Ukrainian War. This is simply a time in which western support for Ukraine is beginning to weaken, and Ukraine’s main ally, the United States, is pursuing a policy of unpredictability regarding further support for Kyiv. We are besides entering a period of global geopolitical unpredictability and attempts at isolationism from the world’s largest democracy. alternatively of the words “Ukraine’s Victory”, “Victory Plan” and “President Zelenskyy Peace Formula”, we hear the words “Peace Negotiations” and “Concessions” in global public debate. On the another hand, we can observe how, against the backdrop of these talks, Putin is intensifying rocket attacks on Ukrainian cities and killing civilians, including many children, both in east and western Ukraine. This all clearly resonates with experiences during the Yugoslav Wars (1991-2001). The leader of Yugoslavia at the time, Slobodan Milosevic, acted on the same principles as Putin does today. He responded to any apparent weakness and requests for negotiations with more and more brutal attacks, killing innocent Croats, Bosniaks, and others. Before the start of the war in Croatia, and later in Bosnia, Milosevic justified the outbreak of war by claiming to defend Serbs in Croatia and emphasizing that Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks were 1 nation. All attempts at future peace negotiations with Milosevic without the usage of force were defeated. Only force, in peculiar American military power, compelled Milosevic to halt committing war crimes and enter into peace negotiations, which subsequently led to the end of the war. Today, the Americans are the world’s only superpower, and just like 30 years ago, they are playing the main function of the world’s main peacekeeper. But will the Americans this time be able to end the war utilizing their power and accomplish a just peace through force?
The United States in the Yugoslav campaign. The road to Dayton.
At the beginning of the Yugoslav conflict, the United States distanced itself from it rather a bit. Washington considered it an interior substance of Yugoslavia itself or the leading European countries. The EU in its present form did not yet exist. The bloc was created in the early 1990s and then began to grow into the institution we know today. Negotiations with the countries of a dying Yugoslavia were conducted by the United Kingdom, France, Portugal and Germany as separate states. Russia was besides going through hard times, and was besides weak to play a function on the Yugoslav chessboard (although the Serbs hoped for its aid to the very last). In specified geopolitical scenarios, the United States at that time remained the only country that could extinguish the Yugoslav powder keg.
The first attitude of the US to the situation in Yugoslavia was very cautious and expectant, based primarily on the position of “doing no harm” to itself. possibly the first diplomatic step was taken by the US embassy in relation to the Yugoslav leadership. The Americans talked about preventing the usage of weapons against the Croats, saying those who did so would receive a retaliatory consequence (fragments of these conversations can be seen in the BBC documentary “The Death of Yugoslavia”). We could hear any akin statements from the Joe Biden administration in late 2021 and early 2022 before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
At the beginning of the Yugoslav conflict, the Americans took many diplomatic steps, realizing that they should do everything possible to prevent the outbreak of war. Diplomacy and the power of argument failed in 1995, in fact, after the Srebrenica massacre. A period after these tragic massacres, NATO began bombing Serbian forces in Bosnia, which subsequently forced the Serbs to retreat from their military positions and yet agree to the Dayton negotiations.
One of the main roles in American diplomacy during the Yugoslav Wars was played by the erstwhile US Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmermann. It was he who tried to persuade the administration of George H. W. Bush and then Bill Clinton to intervene militarily to prevent civilian casualties. Cyrus Vance (Special typical of the UN Secretary General for the Yugoslav conflict) besides played an crucial diplomatic function in the Yugoslav conflicts. He proposed the “Vance Plan” to resolve the Serbian-Croatian conflict. The 2 nations agreed to this plan, but it was blocked by the leaders of the alleged separatist “Serbian Krajina”. Vance continued his work on developing another peace plans to resolve the situation between Croats and Serbs. The plan that he and another diplomats came up with was called the “Z-4 Plan”. However, it was not implemented due to the fact that Croatian troops recaptured the “Serbian Krajina region” through Operation Storm in 1995.
It is besides worth emphasizing that American diplomacy was not so much active in the “Croatian campaign” as in the “Bosnian War”. 1 of the most hard years for American diplomacy was 1994. This was the time erstwhile the situation escalated due to the fighting between Croats and Bosniaks for Mostar. The UN, and later the Americans themselves, were forced to intervene again to end this fresh military theatre on the Yugoslav chessboard. The way to a final peace lay, on the 1 hand, in American diplomacy placing force on the Serbs, backed by its allies from France, the UK and Germany.
Dayton was unavoidable for many reasons. Firstly, the Americans no longer wanted to lose the function of the main peacemaker in this war. Secondly, Clinton understood that the war had to be ended, and that the United States had already spent quite a few money on a run he was hesitant to engage with the first phase of his presidency. Thirdly, the signing of a peace agreement between the warring countries on US territory, under the watchful eye of the president, showed and made the United States a superpower in this fresh era. The “Dayton Agreements” were yet signed in November 1995 in Dayton, Ohio. According to this agreement, Bosnia and Herzegovina remained a united state consisting of 2 subjects: a Bosniak-Croat federation and Republika Srpska, with unified national institutions of government.
However, it should be clearly understood that the Dayton Agreement would not have happened if American diplomacy had not been backed by military force. In the Bosnian run of 1995, which was called “Deliberate Force”, the United States carried out 2,318 airstrikes, which amounted to 65.9 per cent of NATO operations. another airstrikes were carried out by France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Spain and Turkey. According to various sources, NATO forces conducted 3,515 sorties and dropped 1,026 bombs on Serbian positions during the 15 days of bombing. This military operation was key to diplomacy, and in fact led to Dayton. In this case, diplomacy became co-dependent with military force. Peace was achieved through force. This is precisely what Ukraine is seeking and expecting present in its war with the military superiority of Russia.
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The United States in the Russo-Ukrainian War. Are we on the way to Dayton-2?
In light of the arrival of a fresh government in the United States, and corresponding improvement regarding a possible settlement of the war in Ukraine, it is highly hard to find possible scenarios for the end of the Russo-Ukrainian War. This is mostly due to the very deficiency of predictability of president Trump and his administration. At the moment, there is simply a clearly expressed approach focused on global issues that disagree from the priorities of the Biden team.
Against the background of American distancing in the Ukrainian issue, present there is an increase in activity from countries specified as Germany, Britain, Poland and Lithuania. A number of non-European countries are besides striving to take over the initiative previously led by Washington, which is now stressing the work of another NATO states. The United States actively intervened in the Yugoslav run as an integral part of NATO, and Alliance air strikes on Serbian forces were a decisive blow in stopping hostilities in the region. It is noteworthy that most of the “actors” in the Russo-Ukrainian War do not act under the auspices of NATO, but only individually.
It does not seem possible to presume a possible repetition of the US function in suppressing the war, as was the case in the Yugoslav campaign. As a result, 1 should not anticipate a akin conclusion to the war, at least in the close future. Of course, both wars affect issues of cultural identity, alongside territory and its integrity. These conflicts are accompanied by many war crimes by the aggressor, as well as the documentation of specified crimes. However, there are besides a number of differences. In particular, Serbia was a regional power, a regional player, while the Russian Federation is simply a global power with a veto in the UN safety Council. This greatly complicates any tough diplomatic pressure.
Also, Russia’s war against Ukraine is an effort to destruct Ukrainian statehood. In addition, 1 of the main deterrents working against direct western intervention is the Russian atomic arsenal. Of course, the Bryansk and Kursk operations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, as well as Operation Spiderweb and the regular shelling of territory in the Russian Federation, make 1 uncertainty the quantity and quality of Russian atomic weapons, as well as Moscow’s ability to usage them. However, any specified precedent cannot be allowed.
Of course, it is essential to work on an effort at a diplomatic resolution to the war. And in this case, the United States can play 1 of many key roles in a “Dayton-2” format. However, this requires highly favourable circumstances, the probability of which can presently be assessed as low. These include crucial territorial successes made by the Armed Forces of Ukraine, interior instability in the Russian Federation, visible fatigue of the Russian Federation regarding the war, and decisive actions taken by the United States.
Conclusions
A comparison of the Yugoslav and Russo-Ukrainian wars reveals a number of crucial parallels. However, it besides emphasizes crucial differences that prevent the Dayton Agreement experience from being considered a direct inspiration for resolving the war in Ukraine. There are striking similarities erstwhile it comes to war crimes, aggressive rhetoric, and an unwillingness to compromise on the part of the aggressor. In contrast, the scale of the war, as well as Russia’s geopolitical weight and atomic weapons, all fundamentally change the conditions for negotiations and warfare.
The United States is inactive a possible global referee in the conflict, capable of importantly influencing the course of the war and negotiations. Despite this, its current position is little decisive and little active than in the 1990s. Without a comprehensive strategy that combines diplomacy with real military and economical support, achieving a just peace seems unlikely. Unlike the Yugoslav case, the conflict in Ukraine may drag on due to limited global influence, the fragmentation of western support, and the advanced hazard of escalation.
The lessons of Yugoslavia should be studied as an example of an effective combination of force and diplomacy, but we should not effort to transfer them virtually to the largest war of the 21st century. The realities of today’s planet require fresh approaches, broad global consolidation, and a long-term strategical imagination to deter Russian aggression and guarantee safety in Europe.
Andrii Kutsyk holds a PhD in doctrine of Media (Lesya Ukrainka Volyn National University) and a Master’s Degree in east European Studies (University of Warsaw). He is presently a investigation Fellow at the Institute of Political discipline at the University of Gdańsk, a associate of the investigation Institute for European Policy, and secretary of the European diary of Transformation Studies. In 2024, he besides received the Ivan Vyhovsky Prize.
Aleksander Kazak is simply a associate of the investigation and teaching staff at the Institute of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Gdańsk, in the Department of Public Policy and Administration. His work focuses on issues of safety as well as the home and global politics of Belarus, Ukraine and Russia. He regularly publishes analytical materials and provides commentary on current events in these areas in the media.
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