IWONA REICHARDT: Ukraine is making advancement on its way to integration with the European Union. However, this is the first country that is at war at the time of integrating with EU structures, which is an different situation and a challenge, both for Ukraine and the EU. How does the EU measure Ukraine’s road to membership, given these circumstances?
BORJA LASHERAS: There are respective factors to take into account in this regard. erstwhile it comes to the alleged fundamental clusters, meaning the regulation of law and judicial reform, Ukraine has made any progress. But more inactive needs to be done. The approach of the European Commission is more or little the same as it is toward EU integrating countries specified as Albania, Serbia or Montenegro. At the same time, the EU, of course, realizes that Ukraine is fighting an existential war against a atomic power. This war, naturally, has an effect on the integration process. For example, just a fewer days ago, a ultimate Court justice was killed in a drone attack close Kharkiv. Or there are people who worked in the court strategy and who are now fighting on the front lines. This makes Ukraine’s enlargement a different case than what we have experienced with another states. We have enlargement experience with countries that have come out of conflict, but not with a country that’s fighting an existential war.
What I have just said is simply a general assessment. There are of course more nuanced positions, besides inside the Commission, as to how to approach this issue. We want Ukraine to make crucial advancement with implementing reforms but we cannot neglect the fact that it is not Moldova or Albania, meaning it is not a country free from war. This is why I mentioned the example of the ultimate Court justice being killed. erstwhile it comes to the appropriate assessment we gotta say that Ukraine has been given candidate country position not only due to the war, although, yes, had there been no full scale war, Ukraine would have not received candidate position on specified a short notice. This means that both Ukraine and the EU, which is simply a pluralistic family, composed of many institutions and associate states, are learning how this circumstantial integration process should work.
Also, recognizing that Ukraine’s integration with the EU is simply a strategical decision, we should consider how this process should be reasonably expedited. We cannot have Ukraine become a permanent candidate country. In my view it is besides crucial for the result of this war that this process is, like I said, reasonably expedited, provided that Ukraine delivers what it is expected to deliver. Again, considering that Ukraine is in this process at the time of large scale war against Russia, my individual opinion is that we should prioritize very well what we require of Ukraine now.
Which conditions would you prioritize then?
Those pertaining to the regulation of law, which in Ukraine’s case is very important. It was, as you know, 1 of the driving forces of the 2013-14 Revolution of Dignity. In addition to the strengthening of the regulation of law, emphasis should be put on the economy. We want the Ukrainian state to stay resilient and functional. This means that everything that is related to the resilience of the Ukrainian economy and advancement in the regulation of law is important. But not all improvement should be treated in this very same way. For example, erstwhile it comes to specified issues as minorities, I think these conditions should be delivered throughout the negotiating process. However, in the EU we have a associate state that wants Ukraine to do more than what the Venice Commission at times requires of it in terms of national minorities.
From what I realize Ukraine has already done more than the Venice Commission expects it to do.
On national minorities, that is surely the assessment besides and in its study from June 2024 the European Commission gave the green light to start accession negotiations and shared its view that Ukraine had met all conditions. Summing up, Ukraine, like all another candidate country, needs to meet a number of conditions in order to proceed advancing on the accession path. Now it is time for appropriate screenings and bilateral negotiations. Lastly, I think that we request to strengthen Ukraine militarily to levels we have not done yet. We request to do this to aid Ukraine survive.
How can we do that?
Before I answer this question, let me stress again that reforms require quite a few work as well as a functional civilian service system. Ukraine needs thousands of civilian servants, who will implement the acquis communautaire in the country. Yet now, at the time of war, we can see that Ukraine has a problem in this regard; any of its civilian servants are at the front lines, while others have fled the country. That is why I am saying we request to prioritize and why I besides think that in the short word the most immediate action is to supply the maximum military support. Without it, everything else will inevitably suffer.
Can the EU, as a community, supply military support?
In the first phase of the war we did, thanks to the leadership of advanced typical Joseph Borrell and another politicians. We provided this support through the European Peace Facility, which was an intergovernmental fund to be utilized by associate states to carry out any military assistance activities with 3rd countries. Keep in head that this facility is not a part of the EU budget and that is why it’s not subject to the Commission competence or Parliament’s authorization. It’s an intergovernmental fund. Borrell and another politicians were instrumental in utilizing resources from that fund to aid support Ukraine, though indirectly. For example, erstwhile associate states provided weapons to Ukraine and asked the EU for reimbursements, we utilized resources from that fund. However, we can no longer usage this facility due to the fact that for a year now Hungary has been blocking us from doing that. This means that most of the European aid is provided to Ukraine based on bilateral agreements or through initiatives of coalitions between states. Thus, we can say that these are European initiatives, not EU initiatives. As the EU can no longer assist Ukraine through the European Peace Facility, we are now looking for a “Plan B” that would aid us overcome the challenge that has been posed by the Hungarian veto.
What about the usage of Russian assets?
Since May 2024, erstwhile the Council decided to allocate the extraordinary revenues (the alleged windfall profits) from these assets to the European Peace Facility, they have been utilized for military support, including ammunition, and to overall Ukrainian defence. The second tranche (first one, of 1.5 billion euros, delivered in the summer, mostly for financing military support) will be applied next year and thereafter, if we finalize the agreement on the G7 loan, will aid Ukraine manage its budgetary needs. In a nutshell, while in February 2022 the EU had no resources officially planned for military support to Ukraine, it not only started acting to aid Ukraine by imposing sanctions on the Russian Federation, but besides activating the European Peace Facility, which was a very crucial message that the EU wants Ukraine to win and it’s going to find the financial resources essential for that. Overall, the European Commission has proposed up to 35 billion euros to aid Ukraine in 2025 and beyond, through that debt backed by the windfall profits from Russian Central Bank’s immobilized assets. According to authoritative figures, together the EU associate states and the EU as a full have provided around 44 billion euros of military support since February 2022. That is very substantial, but not yet sufficient. We inactive request to do more. I don’t think that what we have been delivering is 0.25 per cent of the EU’s GDP. If we could do that, we will be providing 40 billion euros of support militarily per year and not in 3 years. At the minute we deliver little than half of that per year. So it looks like we are helping Ukraine a lot, but we are not investing in its military and defence as much as Russia does in its own. From the estimates I have been reading I gather that next year Russia is planning to spend over 100 billion euros on its military. That is why the resources we supply are not adequate for the kind of war that Ukraine is fighting against Russia. They have been decisive in helping Ukraine withstand, but it’s not adequate to aid Ukraine prevail and what we actually request is to aid Ukraine prevail.
Back to the integration and enlargement timeline. The president of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen said that the next enlargement should happen in 2030. How realistic is this goal in your view? Ukraine is not alone in the integration process. There is, of course, Moldova, Georgia as well as any Western Balkan states that are inactive waiting at Europe’s door.
Georgia, I think we can say openly, has been backsliding. Let’s see what happens after the elections, but in general we do not want to have forever candidates, like Turkey. That’s a worry. erstwhile it comes to the actual date of enlargement (new members in), I can see that possibly it will not take place in this Commission’s cycle, I mean the Commission that is starting now, but possibly this Commission cycle that is starting now will pave the way for enlargement. However, let us remember that associate states have their national interests and they play a function too. Like your country, Poland, has national interests and wants to preserve them, especially erstwhile there is simply a possible of fresh countries joining the EU. The same can be said about Bulgaria that has blocked North Macedonia’s path. We will see more of that.
Overall, while I feel that the period we are entering now will bring us opportunities, I besides fear that there might be any disappointments, mainly due to the fresh constellations that are forming throughout Europe and in front of our eyes. Think of the migration issue and the political forces that are exploiting it.
It is thus possible that there will be 1 or 2 steps forward, and then a step backward. I think we will gotta work on reconciling different national interests, knowing that at a certain point we will gotta do trade-offs. And let me make it clear: these trade-offs will be faced by both the associate states and the countries that are joining the EU.
That is why we will request to effort to pave the way for the enlargement to work, but besides effort to make enlargement workable. And that requires, possibly not a change of the treaty, but a different knowing of the rules. Sometimes we don’t change the rules, but we change our explanation of them. For example, all country may veto the accession at any step of the process. Thus, to overcome this challenge, we request associate states to put European interests above another interests. At times it works, but at times it doesn’t.
Unfortunately, we live in the times of populism, which Russia has been exploiting. I don’t excuse my country and those who are acting against Ukraine in Poland, but I besides see that any things, like the farmers’ protests at the border, have been in a way enforced from the outside. I won’t say that they have been implanted by Russia, they are most likely homegrown, but I would inactive argue that the current anti-Ukrainian communicative which is gaining popularity in Poland and which besides existed at the time of the protests is not only the work of the Polish people.
Well that’s why things might get complicated and there may be no enlargement with the next Commission. But what I think the next Commission can do is aid keep enlargement on the agenda and aid enlargement advance, with all step of the process. This will require large leadership skills besides from the associate states and a will to work towards a consensus and make it happen.
We don’t talk adequate about the benefits of the enlargement. I don’t think we should think that Ukraine is simply a cost. I think we should keep in head that Ukraine has now 1 of the most powerful armies in Europe and its society has quite a few stamina, despite the immense losses it has encountered. As specified it can contribute to Europe. I hope we will work to shift this communicative from 1 that focuses on the cost of the enlargement to 1 that besides emphasizes the opportunities it can bring. However, as you said there are these forces that will emphasize the opposite…
Since these forces are most likely pushed or sponsored by Russia, what is the current EU policy towards Russia?
Our main policy towards Russia first and foremost means no high-level bilateral contacts. This will be continued, unless Russia stops the aggression in Ukraine and pays reparations. These are our red lines. Our policy towards Russia thus derives from our assessment of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. It besides calls for diversification from Russian gas and energy sources, which a couple of associate states, Hungary and Slovakia, have deviated from. But overall, we have made large advancement in that regard. Most of the oil exports are no longer in place. The situation with the natural gas may not be the same yet, but imports have decreased dramatically.
What we don’t have yet in place is simply a future Russia policy. Before the full-scale invasion, we had any principles, we wanted to work with Russian civilian society. We inactive have these principles and plans to work with Russian civilian society, but besides at this minute the fundamentals of our policy towards Russia are based on our policy towards Ukraine. This means support towards Ukraine and its defence against Russian aggression. Unfortunately, a fewer associate states don’t want to prosecute specified a policy and want to go back to business as usual. We are seeing it especially in the activities of the Hungarian government. possibly at any point another associate states will besides get keen on that, but the question is what’s our imagination for the long term? This is where we don’t have a discussion yet in the EU. At this minute this discussion may inactive be premature. In my view, erstwhile there is simply a war against Ukraine, our policy towards Russia needs to be based on maximum force on the Kremlin, sanctions and the weakening of Russia’s military industry.
Is peace going to return to the European continent?
I don’t think that peace in Europe is possible with Putin and his regime. I think at best we will have what I call a cold peace. Or a “cold war” but written with tiny letters, not capital letters. And even that will depend on what we will do and what Russia will do. At the moment, peace is not something that Russia wants. Russia now wants conflict. I would not say that the Kremlin wants to have an open full war in Europe. But it definitely wants to undermine our systems, political and economic.
In this way, Russia is already at war with us. It is simply a hybrid war, which is waged against our systems, populations, political parties and so on. This does not mean that we will go to war with Russia, but we gotta realize that in the Kremlin’s view Russia is at war against us.
So no peace in Europe with Putin in power, yes?
Yes. I don’t think we can have a real peace with Putin in power. At best we can have any kind of a cold war and tensions. As well as more sabotage and violence.
Why do you think that?
In my view, the endurance of the government is contingent on the war in Ukraine and that is why the Kremlin won’t let go. That is why it is very crucial to support Ukraine to our maximum capacity. We Europeans request to invest massively in the military industry, rearm ourselves and invest in deterrence. Only this will work with Russia. Weakness is something that Russia exploits. It will usage it to undermine us, to attack our societies, our politicians. That is why, I don’t think that real peace is possible with Putin in power.
Francisco de Borja Lasheras presently works on Ukraine at the Cabinet of the EU advanced typical Josep Borrell. He was peculiar advisor for Ukraine at the European External Action Service and besides a non-resident elder fellow with the Transatlantic defence and safety programme at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA).
Iwona Reichardt is the deputy editor in chief of New east Europe and a associate of the board of the Jan Nowak-Jeziorański College of east Europe in Wrocław.
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