JAN FARFAŁ: As a erstwhile president of the EU Military Committee, how would you envision the main pillars that request to underpin the European Defence Union?
ROBERT BRIEGER: I think what the European Union needs most, especially in defence matters, is simply a method for reaching unanimous decisions at the table where choices are made. That requires unity of effort, political leadership, and the willingness to supply the essential resources. Additionally, there is an urgent request to change the mindset, starting with the political class, but besides within our societies across the EU associate states.
When you mention to the European Defence Union, is there any area, be it hybrid, cyber, or crisis management, where the EU Defence Union can supply a unique added value to NATO?
We have different histories and different tasks, but present we face a common threat and a common challenge, which requires us to strengthen our ties. NATO remains at the forefront erstwhile it comes to collective defence. But, on the another hand, 23 of 32 NATO associate states are European, and so close cooperation is essential. We request to intensify the exchange of information. And erstwhile it comes to the Defence Union, the discussion within European institutions about what it should actually look like is inactive unfinished. We do not yet have a clear image of what is meant by “Defence Union”. Is it simply about strengthening the European defence manufacture and building a common defence financial market, or is it more than that? Is it about participating in the deterrence and defence of the EU’s territory? We have Article 42(7), but we have not yet defined or operationalised what this article truly entails.
Therefore, there are inactive many question marks to address, and we face a strong sense of urgency due to the fact that the threat from the East is undeniable. Even if this war ends with a ceasefire or peace accord, Russia will rebuild its capacity very quickly, and we already know the ambitions of the Kremlin.
Does this mean we request a two-tier approach: being prepared for possible Russian aggression within 3 years, while besides building the kind of political and industrial union that can endure over the long term?
The threat is real. 1 logical result is that we must prepare much better, not only in terms of industrial capacity but besides in procurement.
When it comes to this issue, is there any “silver bullet” to address the fragmentation of the defence market, for example, the fact that we have 17 different types of tanks, while at the same time satisfying national interests in maintaining any form of local production?
I’m not certain there is simply a silver bullet. It’s a complicated process. On the 1 hand, we request to build financial incentives to overcome fragmentation. The European Commission already provides crucial backing to foster cooperative projects, but this is evidently not adequate to accelerate progress. We besides request political will among associate states, and we must accelerate flagship projects specified as the Franco-German fighter aircraft of the future if we want to compete with another major actors. If the European Union inactive wants to stay applicable on the planet phase of large players, as is written into almost all of our strategical concepts, then, as prof. [Joseph] Stiglitz mentioned in the Austrian media, we gotta stand on our own feet. That is the key point.
At the same time, integration cannot halt at the level of large companies. We besides request to bring in smaller firms, peculiarly those providing spare parts, ammunition, and another critical supplies. That would be a major step for the European Union in becoming strategically relevant. This is very much in line with the temper on the east Flank.
That would besides require satisfying Warsaw’s aspirations to contribute meaningfully to technological improvement alternatively than being reduced to a function in the supply chain. Nonetheless, even with the best equipment available, this would besides rise the question of mobility. Looking ahead to mobility and partnerships, how would you measure the next steps that PESCO or the EU Battlegroups request to take over the next 12 to 24 months?
This is not only a PESCO project; it is besides a NATO project, and a shared ambition of both organisations. This is crucial erstwhile we face the necessity of moving larger formations from West to East, a logical step in preparedness vis-à-vis possible aggressors. But there are inactive core questions to answer and issues to resolve. The legal framework must be harmonised among associate states in order to let fast transportation. Infrastructure is another critical element. This besides raises the question of financing. Credible steps have already been taken to implement these work strands, but erstwhile it comes to details, this remains a long-term project, due to the fact that much of the existing infrastructure is either inadequate or outdated and cannot support the transport of dense loads.
There are besides procedural hurdles, not only among associate states but even within any countries. For instance, in Germany, there are difficulties in transporting ammunition from 1 Bundesland to another. We besides request to strengthen the supply chain across the Atlantic and enhance the movement of critical goods. Preparing for warfighting requires accepting certain risks in the context of that preparation. I am not certain that this sense of urgency is shared by all stakeholders.
And is it right to presume that European conflict Groups could become a forerunner to a European army?
Let us say that the recently established fast deployment capacity is simply a brigade-sized formation with any strategical enablers, first and foremost designed for crisis management outside Europe. Within the European Union, we have not yet addressed the necessity of participation in territorial defence. We request to rethink our full posture and design, and we must clarify with the Alliance what the European Union’s contribution should be.
We have a single set of forces. The challenge is how to make usage of our capacities so that collective defence can function effectively, with the European Union taking work in areas where it can contribute most. For instance, this could include the protection of critical infrastructure or the advancement of military mobility to establish the conditions for swift transport. What we request in this process is simply a clear definition of Article 42(7): how to operationalise it, and what should happen if Article 5 of NATO and Article 42(7) of the European Union are invoked simultaneously.
What would that mean in practice, and how would we interact? 1 crucial precondition for defining the essential procedures is the exchange of information, but so far, this is officially not possible between the 2 organisations. That is my experience from Brussels. At the end of the day, it boils down to political will.
Speaking of political will – what happens if, in 2027, respective Wagner groups operating from Belarus begin crossing the Polish frontier, prompting Poland to invoke Article 42(7)? What happens then?
That is the question politicians must ask themselves and answer appropriately. My advice as a military expert is – do not waste time. We must clearly specify Article 42.7 in coordination with NATO, enter into structured talks with the Alliance, and harmonize our actions. It could happen that Article 5 is not invoked, and only Article 42.7 applies, then common support obligations are in force. That means associate states, including my own country, are obliged to supply support. But to what extent, resources, actions, troops, remains undefined. There are no concrete plans. We have no household of plans for European defence, as NATO does.
In essence, from my 3 years as president of the Military Committee, I have 2 core messages. What we request most is unity and leadership at all levels, starting with Brussels, but extending to associate states and society at large. And we request it as of yesterday. Unfortunately.
This material appeared in cooperation with Club Alpbach Poland – an organisation associating Polish scholarship holders of the European Forum Alpbach – a conference that has been a leading platform for discussion on the future of Europe since 1945.
General Robert Brieger is the president of the EU Military Committee between 2022-2025. He joined the Austrian armed forces in 1975. He shaped the armed forces planning of the Austrian Bundesheer as the Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defence. He besides commanded Austrian troops in Kosovo (2001 – 2002) and led a multinational troop as EUFOR commander in Bosnia and Herzegovina (2011 – 2012).
Jan Farfał is simply a historian and fresh PhD postgraduate of the Oxford School of Global and Area Studies at the University of Oxford. He has served as Associate manager at Visegrad Insight, investigation Assistant to Timothy Garton Ash, and Jerzy Giedroyc Fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna.
