Currently, the Belarusian society is 1 which is experiencing the effects of a re-emerging Iron Curtain between the West and Russia the most. Visa applications, bus tickets to Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia, and queues on the border with the European Union are recurrent topics in Belarusian independent media. Why are the EU visa policies so crucial for the Belarusian society? And why should it besides substance for the EU?
Before 2020 Belarus was a planet champion in Schengen visas per capita, with fast trains to Vilnius, Warsaw and Berlin. Since the crackdown on protests and the start of mass repressions following the forged elections in 2020, between 300,000 and 500,000 have left. Most families have at least 1 associate in exile. For comparison, the exodus numbers in Russia since its 2022 invasion of Ukraine are comparable, but the population of Belarus is 16 times smaller.
Since Russian troops have been utilizing Belarusian territory in its war against Ukraine, many policies applied the same restrictions to Belarusian and Russian nationals and the number of visas for Belarusians has dropped from 681,000 in 2018 to 164,000 in 2023. Yet, the home repressions against Belarusians persists.
Obtaining a Schengen visa for a Belarusian: much harder than for a Russian
Living in a low-income society divided by mass exodus, most Belarusians travel to the EU to see their repressed loved ones, alternatively than to visit tourist attractions. For this, they request tourist visas, given that the issue of guest visas to Belarusians is limited or stopped by many EU countries and any kind of non-tourist visa is dangerous to have in Belarus. In Minsk, only a twelve of EU embassies issue tourist visas and it can take a very long time. For example, the German embassy sets the visit date for visa applicants within 8 months after submission of the request on its website. The visit date itself may be in a year and a half.
Given that in Russia it is somewhat easier to get the Schengen visa than in Belarus, any Belarusians opt to spend 4 nights on a bus, traveling to Moscow or St Petersburg and back, both to apply for a visa and to get it. any of the EU embassies in Minsk seem to only reenforce this practice. A grotesque example comes from Belarusian participants in an EU exchange programme “established for the expansion of contacts between EU and Belarus nationals to share best practices.” To get a Schengen visa to Finland, an applicant had to go from Belarus to Russia – told to do so by the Estonian embassy in Minsk, which is formally entitled to accept applications for Finnish visas in Belarus. And the visa in question was for 1 entry and a maximum of 10 days.
The practicalities of a journey from Belarus to the EU and back – including the quest for the bus tickets (always deficient and prohibitively expensive), queues at the border exceeding 24 hours, corruption among bus drivers selling places in queue to passengers, humiliating checks at the EU border check and risks of detention upon the return to Belarus are topics in their own right.
The main beneficiary of EU visa policies for Belarusians is Russia
Restrictive visa policies contribute to the divided between those Belarusians who left for the West and those who stay, with the second more likely to turn to Russia in the future. While not being drafted to the war, Belarusians do not request visas to go to Russia, are easy employed and little frequently arrested there. Russia benefits from the cheaper Belarusian workforce while besides gradually replacing western businesses in the Belarusian economy (recent examples include Uber and Tinder). And even the Belarusian Schengen visa applicants involuntarily contribute to Russian economy by paying for buses, hostels and food during their trips to Moscow and St Petersburg.
Alyaksandr Lukashenka expressed satisfaction with the Lithuanian ban on the entry of Belarusian cars (the ban was partially revoked later), stating it would prevent the flow of Belarusian money to the markets of neighbouring EU states. However, the more crucial benefits for the government might be related to the safety goals: the more people cross the Belarus-EU border, the more hard it is to control all passenger that might frequently carry donations to the families of political prisoners, prohibited books, or legal papers helping the repressed to mitigate dispossession of property (e.g., power of lawyer allowing to sale property in Belarus).
The state media present the fresh expansion of visa free entry for westerners to Belarus against the news about further complications of entry, employment and stay of Belarusians in the Schengen zone. Paradoxically, the speech of Belarusian state-run media is far from isolationist: the headlines are riddled with mentions of Belarus developing partnerships with Pakistan, Egypt, Hungary, Serbia, etc. Thus, the image that the propaganda creates is of the West, especially the Baltics and Poland, unilaterally boycotting Belarusians and being increasingly marginal in that. In this aspect, Russia looks like the opposite.
Given the number of Belarusians forced to leave their country westwards, the societal connections between Belarus and EU countries will not vanish any time soon. Hundreds of thousands of Belarusians will contact their siblings, children and close friends residing in Lithuania, Poland, Germany, etc. These connections will look differently though, erstwhile meetings of household members, classmates and colleagues only happen online, with 1 organization of communication constantly risking their freedom and having to navigate topics carefully. Already today, Belarusians feel that “the Iron Curtain is drawn not by the organization they expected to draw it.” What if the EU treats Belarusians with a policy that is more pro-Russian than Belarusians themselves are?
How do Belarusians respond to the visa situation and what do they need?
Belarusians are facing the grim visa situation in the wider context: the Baltic states and Finland prohibited the entry of private cars registered in Belarus “to prevent Russia from circumventing the EU sanctions”, diplomats and consulate workers exempted; a novelty easing the employment of Belarusians in Hungary caused protest of Central and east European politicians; in Lithuania, withdrawal of residence permits from Belarusian workers travelling home was discussed, while the Lithuanian government halved bus connections to Belarus; Lukashenka’s government unilaterally opens borders for westerners; the exchange of prisoners between Russia and the West remarkably ignores Belarusian political prisoners who are more numerous, imprisoned for longer time (and since the times prior to the full-scale war), and in worse conditions.
Meanwhile, in the Belarusian timeline, 2020 remains more crucial than 2022. As the Belarusian army is not in Ukraine, Belarusians’ relatives do not die on the frontline and nor bring money earned from the war – a practice which became regular in Russia. Instead, regular politically-motivated arrests and another forms of political repressions are only on the rise in Belarus. Therefore, alternatively than relating the visa restrictions to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, many Belarusians see them as the aftermath of 2020, with the Belarusian democratic forces being blamed for their expected inability to represent Belarusians’ interests. The pro-democratic decision of 2020 is at hazard of being discredited together with the ideas it was inspired by, sociologists say. As of today, however, the request for visas and bus tickets to the EU among Belarusians is soaring.
Aside from ethics, if the EU’s goal is to make allies who would sabotage the Kremlin’s orders, leak information on Russian military’s movements and safe the ways for evacuation from the country – these things are inactive being done inside Belarus – Belarusians should be given more opportunities of mobility and in individual contacts with the EU world. In fact, visa policies can be a tool to make the Kremlin little influential, not more powerful – both for Belarusians and the EU.
On alternatives to pushing Belarusians further into the sphere of Russian influence, there is simply a virtual consensus among Belarusian democratic forces and analysts. Long-term multi-entry Schengen visas (even if with a tiny number of days of stay), renewal of railway connections to the EU, preserving diplomatic presence in Minsk and separating policies on Belarusians from policies towards Russians can aid Belarusians feel more safe and unite a larger part of them, both inside the country and in exile, on pro-European positions. Thus, effective policies for Belarusians can show a desirable alternate to the pro-European part of the Russian population.
Andrei Vazyanau holds a PhD in social anthropology and works at the European Humanities University in Vilnius, Lithuania.
“We suport the Belarusian Awakening’24” is simply a task co-financed by Solidarity Fund PL within the framework of Polish improvement cooperation of the Ministry of abroad Affairs of the Republic of Poland in the amount of PLN 230,000.
This publication expresses the views of the author only and cannot be identified with the authoritative position of the Ministry of abroad Affairs of the Republic of Poland.
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