Between 2020 and 2025, relations between Belarus and Ukraine underwent a crucial transformation, sliding into a deep crisis despite the formal maintenance of diplomatic ties. Political dialog between Minsk and Kyiv has mostly disappeared, trade has almost entirely collapsed, while the inter-state border now functions as a fortified barrier.
At present, Belarus-Ukraine relations can best be described as hybrid. Over these years, a fundamental shift has taken place: Belarus moved from being a mixed partner of Ukraine, at times providing strategically crucial materials, to serving as Russia’s chief collaborator in Europe. The 2020 protests were a decisive turning point for Alyaksandr Lukashenka. Since then, his legitimacy has not been restored, yet his geopolitical alignment has changed dramatically. Today, the Belarusian leader closely follows the Kremlin’s policy line, while his area for independent manoeuvre has been reduced to a minimum.
Illusionary hopes
The circumstances that forced Lukashenka to shift his position are evident. He is effectively repaying Russia for its willingness to support him during his crashing of the 2020 protests. Paradoxically, the word “special military operation” could just as easy have described a hypothetical deployment of Russian units to Belarus during the protests of August-September 2020. specified an intervention, however, has never taken place. The hopes that Belarus might strengthen its political agency and break free from the Kremlin’s influence rapidly proved illusionary. Instead, the country remains trapped in ideological narratives about the “triune Slavic people”, that is the thought that Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians belong to a single, united household of East Slavic people; the alleged destabilizing function of the West; and a deliberate exclusion of any anti-Russian elements from the authoritative rhetoric. Lukashenka’s contacts with Vladimir Putin have only deepened since that moment, and his public statements now include references to Russia’s “new regions”, meaning the occupied territories of Ukraine.
The anti-Lukashenka protests in 2020 marked the starting point of a fundamental change in Belarus-Ukraine relations. Interpreted by the authorities as an effort to overthrow the government in Minsk, they not only entrenched home repressions but besides triggered mass emigration. Hundreds of thousands of Belarusians fled their homeland to escape persecution. The existing visa-free government made Ukraine the most accessible destination, and as a consequence a large Belarusian community settled there. Yet the Ukrainian leadership was slow to articulate a clear position on the dramatic events in Belarus. It besides failed to channel the human possible of Belarusian migrants in ways that could have served Ukraine’s national interest.
A falsely pragmatic approach
The subsequent course of events unfolded in a paradoxical manner. In 2021, after the EU introduced sanctions against Belarus, Ukraine aligned itself with these measures, including by suspending air traffic with Minsk. The immediate trigger for sanctions was the forced landing of a Ryanair flight from Athens to Vilnius in May 2021 and the detention of Roman Protasevich, 1 of the leaders of the NEXTA media project, together with his partner. At the same time, however, the Ukrainian leadership pursued what could be described as a falsely pragmatic approach towards Lukashenka’s regime. While refraining from political designation of Lukashenka, Zelenskyy’s government continued to import bitumen, fuel, lubricants, and electricity from Belarus. In 2021 alone, these trade operations brought Minsk around 2.9 billion US dollars, a figure that understandably provoked strong criticism from the Belarusian democratic forces.
It is worth stressing that Lukashenka’s opponents – mostly drawn from NGOs and civilian society – deliberately avoided calling themselves an “opposition”. The word they like to usage is that of “Belarusian democratic forces”. This semantic choice gained small traction in Ukraine and importantly complicated dialog between Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s squad and Ukrainian politicians. Compounding matters, many of Lukashenka’s most visible opponents, including Ales Bialiatski, Viktar Babaryka, and Maria Kalesnikava, were imprisoned, while Tsikhanouskaya and her entourage lacked the political weight and experience to break the ice with Kyiv. Although Tsikhanouskaya enjoyed a political “honeymoon” in relations with Lithuania and Poland, her squad was in no hurry to build a comparable level of engagement with Ukraine.
Contrary to a common assumption, the final phase of preparations for Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine from Belarusian territory was not the Zapad 2021 exercises held in autumn of that year. Instead, it was the joint Russian-Belarusian Allied Resolve drills which were conducted in early 2022. These manoeuvres were preceded by the migration crisis on Belarus’s borders with Lithuania and Poland, which effectively served as a distraction. Under the cover of exercises, the Kremlin deployed a strike group in Belarus, whose real mission was to advance on Kyiv. There are grounds to believe that Lukashenka was mostly aware of Moscow’s strategical intentions – something suggested by his February 2022 interview with Russian propagandist Dmitry Kiselyov – although he likely did not know the exact date of the invasion.
Under the white-red-white flag
The invasion on February 24th 2022 permanently reshaped Ukrainian attitudes towards Lukashenka. Although his rating among Ukrainians rose somewhat after Russia’s hybrid aggression in 2014 and the end of the word of Lithuania’s president Dalia Grybauskaitė, this was only a temporary phenomenon. Since 2022, the Belarusian self-proclaimed president lost this ground and cannot anticipate to recover it. His own words – “Putin and I are co-aggressors” – combined with Russia’s usage of Belarusian territory to launch rocket strikes against Ukraine, brought about a serious deterioration in Belarusian-Ukrainian relations. What is more, Lukashenka’s opponents, peculiarly those ready to take up arms, have moved into the spotlight and gained fresh significance.
The deterioration of Belarusian-Ukrainian relations after February 24th 2022 did not mean the absence of Belarusians on the Ukrainian side. On the contrary, while Lukashenka aligned himself with Moscow and allowed Russian forces to usage Belarusian territory for the assault on Kyiv, many of his opponents chose a different path. Belarusian volunteers had already been present in Ukraine’s defence forces since 2014, erstwhile the tactical group “Belarus” was created. The first Belarusian casualties date back to the Anti-Terrorist Operation and later the Joint Forces Operation.
After the outbreak of the full-scale war, Belarusians fighting under the white-red-white flag managed to stand out amid the wave of Ukrainian citizens who rushed to defend their homeland. A turning point came on Freedom Day, March 25th 2022, with the formation of the Kastuś Kalinoŭski Battalion, which later expanded into the Kastuś Kalinoŭski Regiment. present this is the largest abroad contingent within Ukraine’s defence forces. All in all, over the past 3 and a half years, respective 100 Belarusians have served in these volunteer ranks, more than 60 have been killed, and at least 2 – known by their call signs “Klishch” and “Trombli” – stay in Russian captivity. Among those who gave their lives in combat against Russia were specified respected figures as Miroslav Lazovsky (“Mysh”) and Ivan Marchuk (“Brest”).
In autumn 2022, rocket strikes from Belarusian territory against Ukraine ceased, most likely after Lukashenka had received a discreet informing from Kyiv about possible retaliatory strikes. Belarusian oil refineries, after all, lie within the scope of Ukrainian rocket and artillery systems. Notably, in the first weeks of the full-scale invasion, Russian and Ukrainian delegations met in Belarus for ceasefire talks. These talks failed, and Lukashenka’s possible as a mediator has now proven exhausted. However, in December 2022, the first Ostroh Forum took place in Lviv, bringing together Ukrainian and Belarusian experts and politicians to discuss the future of bilateral relations.
Since autumn 2022, various representatives of the Belarusian democratic forces have visited Ukraine. Pavel Latushka and Zianon Pazniak, Franak Viačorka and Anatoly Lebedko, Vadim Kabanchuk and Anzhalika Melnikova, Valery Kovalevsky and Zmicier Shchygelski – all held meetings in Kyiv, frequently with Mykhailo Podolyak, advisor to the head of the Presidential Office and informal curator of relations with the Belarusian democratic forces. Yet, at the authoritative level, expectations were modest. Occasional encounters between Zelenskyy and Tsikhanouskaya at global events were limited to greetings and handshakes. A full-fledged visit by Tsikhanouskaya to Kyiv inactive remains unlikely.
A paradoxical role
Although Belarusian diplomats withdrew from Ukraine on March 19th 2022, diplomatic relations between the 2 states did not collapse altogether. In April 2023, however, after Lukashenka hosted Denis Pushilin – the head of the alleged Donetsk People’s Republic and Russia’s collaborator – in Minsk, Kyiv recalled its ambassador, Ihor Kyzym. By the end of the year, Kyzym was formally dismissed, and his Belarusian counterpart in Kyiv, Ihor Sokol, besides lost his post. Even so, a fistful of Ukrainian diplomats stay in Minsk.
At the same time, Belarusian territory has assumed a paradoxical function in the war. In 2022 and 2023, Ukrainians who had been illegally deported by the Russian occupying forces were able to return home via Belarus. The country has besides served as a transit point for occasional prisoner exchanges between Russia and Ukraine.
At the beginning of 2023, an unidentified drone strike damaged a Russian A-50 early informing and control aircraft stationed at the Machulishchy airbase in Belarus, forcing its relocation to Russia. This episode marked a turning point in military cooperation between Moscow and Minsk, and its various dimensions call for a closer examination.
On March 25th 2023, Vladimir Putin declared his readiness to deploy tactical atomic weapons on Belarusian territory “at the request of Alyaksandr Lukashenka”. This decision was not only an act of atomic blackmail – a central instrument in the Kremlin’s strategy – but besides an asymmetric consequence to the global Criminal Court’s arrest warrant issued for Putin. The subsequent developments – Lukashenka’s interviews with Russian propagandists, training exercises for nuclear-capable transportation systems, and the orchestrated hysteria surrounding the alleged “Oreshnik” strategy – only underscored the degree to which Minsk’s actions stay directed by the Kremlin.
Russia besides maximized its usage of Belarusian army stockpiles of military equipment and ammunition to replenish its own reserves. The next logical step was the cooperation of Belarusian enterprises with Russian companies, as well as the independent fulfilment of orders for the Russian military-industrial complex. The scale of this interaction continues to grow. specified cooperation reflects Lukashenka’s strategy of avoiding direct participation in combat operations while maintaining loyalty to Putin.
A striking demonstration of this loyalty came with the transfer of Wagner Group units to Belarus after Yevgeny Prigozhin’s failed mutiny in the summertime of 2023. Seemingly, the Wagnerites vanished into Belarusian forests; any became instructors for the Belarusian Interior Ministry’s interior Troops, while others left the country. Lukashenka effectively performed uncomfortable tasks on Putin’s behalf.
In fresh months, Lukashenka has renewed his attempts to present himself as a mediator in efforts to end the Russia-Ukraine war. respective factors appear to have encouraged this initiative: the smooth reaffirmation of his presidency in January 2025; a series of successful operations by Belarusian and Russian safety services against political opponents; and a tentative warming of relations with the United States. Yet, Kyiv continues to view Lukashenka with deep mistrust, and there is small possible that specified trust could be restored. At the same time, the interior situation within the Belarusian democratic forces – marked by the concentration of influence in the hands of Tsikhanouskaya and the organizational weakness of its structures – has likewise hindered the intensification of dialogue.
Current Belarus-Ukraine relations are thus summed up by the following developments. Kyiv is not prepared either to reconstruct full diplomatic relations with Minsk or to deepen its engagement with the Belarusian democratic movement. The function of Belarusian volunteers in Ukraine’s defence forces is gradually diminishing for both nonsubjective and subjective reasons, though their presence remains visible. Ukrainian representatives proceed to keep political contacts with the democratic forces, while communication with Minsk takes place primarily through intelligence channels. economical ties are negligible, despite Lukashenka’s repeated signals of interest in participating in Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction.
Looking ahead, a logical step would be the articulation of a joint position on Belarus within the framework of the Lublin Triangle. This could besides supply an chance to transfer and advance Ukraine’s experience given the many shared features of Minsk and Kyiv’s post-Soviet trajectories.
Yevhen Mahda is simply a Ukrainian political scientist and analyst and the executive manager of the Institute of planet Policy, a think-tank based in Kyiv.
