Mapowanie scenariuszy przyszłych relacji Rosja-Kazachstan

neweasterneurope.eu 2 tygodni temu

“The Kazakhs never had any statehood.” – Vladimir Putin, president of the Russian Federation (2014)

“Our independency is our dearest treasure, which our grandfathers fought for. First of all, we will never surrender it to someone, and secondly, we will do our best to defend it.” – Nursultan Nazarbayev, erstwhile president of Kazakhstan (2014)

The relation between Russia and Kazakhstan has been mostly stable. Yet under the surface, significant developments have occurred in the aftermath of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Kazakhstan, erstwhile perceived as an informal extension of Russia, has experienced changes specified as a notable emergence in anti-imperialist sentiment, active engagement in nation-building efforts, and the distancing of the authorities in Astana from supporting the war. In the following analysis, we research the future of Russia-Kazakhstan relations by examining possible shifts in Russia’s home politics and cross-referencing these scenarios with possible developments in bilateral affairs. As a result, we present 12 scenarios that outline the scope of possibilities. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that given the unpredictable nature of Russia’s war in Ukraine, future Russian-Kazakh relations could easy go either way.

Context of Russia’s war against Ukraine

Kazakhstan has been greatly affected since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by increasing calls for decolonization and de-Russification. 2 major implications can be identified here:

  1. Kazakh society has actively sought to accelerate ongoing nation-building processes amid a notable emergence in anti-imperialist sentiment.
  2. Kazakh authorities have refused to back the

This stance has prompted Russian officials, like the Moscow city parliament Deputy Sergey Savostyanov, to call for including Kazakhstan in a false communicative of a “demilitarization and denazification zone” to defend Russia’s safety interests. A commentator on government propagandist Vladimir Solovyov’s regular show even declared that “the next problem [after Ukraine] is Kazakhstan.” While not part of the mainstream Russian narrative, these discourses show the possible for either covert or overt aggression from a revanchist, irredentist Russia that could make regarding Kazakhstan in the future. This result is grounded and based on the war in Ukraine, which will alter Russia’s military and economical capabilities, as well as its home political situation.

Setting the framework

Below, we explain the different scenarios that could happen in Russia’s home politics:

  • Democratization (The Gorbachev story): A leader in Russia emerges who, like Gorbachev, tries to improvement and modernize Russia. In this scenario, Russia ends its war against Ukraine; transitions back to a civilian economy; strengthens its democratic institutions; and redevelops relations with the West.
  • Autocratization (The Putin story): The status-quo remains with Putin in power. Russia experiences expanding repression and totalitarianism. The economy continues to militarize; the gradual socialization of youth within this context takes place through the education system; and the war in Ukraine continues.
  • Radicalization (The Prigozhin story): A extremist right-wing fascist group takes power in Moscow. A long war; deficiency of military progress; economical sanctions; and tens of thousands of Russian dead soldiers lead to an even more openly pro-war faction coming to power.
  • Time of troubles (The Yeltsin story): Russia is gripped by expanding home political uncertainty. The Russian political elite succumbs to factional infighting; civilian unrest breaks out in major cities; or peripheral regions inhabited by cultural minorities become Overall, Russian politics is dominated by home concerns and the country is incapable to exert or defend its perceived interests abroad.

Next, we explain the scenarios related to external geopolitical developments between Russia and Kazakhstan:

  • Multi-vectorism: Russia and Kazakhstan keep constructive relations. Kazakhstan engages with China to increase investments in the country while Russia maintains its cultural and military dominance in the region. Engagement between Kazakhstan and the West is limited compared to that of Russia and China.
  • Russkiy Mir expands: An emboldened Russia, possibly following a triumph or favorable negotiated settlement in Ukraine, expands its military presence in Central Asia and heightens tensions with NATO associate states.
  • Moscow is silent: akin to the twilight years of the russian Union, Russia does not have the capacity or the political will to keep its influence abroad or advance its power through economical and military means.

Scenarios

1.Democratization – Multi-vectorism

After a full military defeat following its full-scale invasion, the Kremlin besides loses the fight with a democratic home competitor. Kazakhstan, sensing a diminished threat from Russia, full embraces its policy of “Kazakhstanization” by utilizing the time to strengthen its sovereignty and become a more independent country. Therefore, it continues with its multi-vector policy without limiting itself to respective options, resulting in maximized benefit. Russia acknowledges that a broader network of allies will strengthen its geopolitical standing, as well as its drastically weakened economy after the war, so it tries to strengthen its relations with Kazakhstan.

  1. Democratization – Russkiy Mir expands

After Russia’s full military defeat in Ukraine, Kazakhstan senses a diminished threat from Russia and eases its policy of “Kazakhstanization”. It strategically leverages the influx of Russian businesses to bolster its economy. Kazakhstan intensifies its bilateral relations with Russia, already being a top trading partner and accounting for a 5th of Kazakhstan’s full external trade, without seeking to diversify its abroad policy. Russia, in turn, welcomes this economical partnership, viewing a strong Kazakhstan as an ally that can aid compensate for the resources lost during the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. This besides offers Moscow a counterbalance to its dependence on China.

  1. Democratization – Moscow is silent

In the wake of its defeat in Ukraine, Russia undergoes a democratization process. However, the country’s diminished resources and geopolitical influence make it little appealing for Kazakhstan. Consequently, Kazakhstan strategically shifts its focus distant completely from Russia and redirects its resources in order to strengthen relations with China, Turkey, and the West.

  1. Autocratization – Multi-vectorism

The war in Ukraine becomes a simmering, frozen conflict. Russia’s economy is overheated but stable, being able to mostly weather western sanctions. Russia continues balancing relations with Kazakhstan, allowing Kazakh multi-vectorism by accepting its limited capacity to aid Kazakhstan prosper economically while inactive maintaining a dominant cultural and military function in the region. Russia tacitly allows increased Chinese economical influence as it forges closer ties with Beijing to counter the West. At the same time, Russia and Kazakhstan inactive depend on 1 another economically, with Astana playing an crucial function in allowing Russia to bypass western sanctions. In the short to average word (one to 5 years), we justice this to be the most likely scenario.

  1. Autocratization – Russkiy Mir expands

The West stops aiding Ukraine. Russia is winning the war and a Chinese-sponsored “peace deal” is agreed. Russia freezes the conflict in order to remainder and rebuild. Western sanctions ease and its economy starts increasing again. However, the country is inactive highly militarized. Russia takes this chance to build its Eurasian project, integrating Kazakhstan and another states in the region through the Eurasian economical Union. In consequence to increasing Kazakh nationalism, a inactive revanchist Kremlin sponsors pro-Russian groups in northern Kazakhstan under the pretext of protecting Russian speakers. While we do not justice this to be the most likely scenario, it could inactive happen. A Trump triumph in the 2024 US election may lead to a more isolationist United States that withdraws from Europe and stops supporting Ukraine. In this case, a script like this becomes possible.

  1. Autocratization – Moscow is silent

Russia is preoccupied with its war in Ukraine and severe economical troubles at home. National Kazakh identity strengthens through the promotion of policies concerning Kazakh language, culture, and history. China, Turkey, the Gulf states and Western states increase cooperation with Kazakhstan. Astana diversifies distant from Russian energy dependence over time. Kazakhstan agrees to a deal with China to build a trans-Caspian pipeline that bypasses Russia. Moscow cannot interfere, neglecting the Central Asian region in favour of focusing on Ukraine and dealing with problems at home. In the long word (ten years and more), we justice this to be the most possible scenario.

  1. Radicalization – Multi-vectorism

If the war in Ukraine continues and Russia keeps losing blood and treasure on the battlefield, there is simply a anticipation that more reactionary forces will take power. Even though it would mostly be focused on Ukraine, this fresh government would effort to bring Kazakhstan closer to its sphere of influence. Moscow would start more steadily utilizing the carrot-and-stick approach. The erstwhile interruptions to oil flows or restrictions of operations that affected the Caspian Pipeline Consortium would be the fresh norm. There could be a more aggressive propaganda run to advance separatism among Russians in northern Kazakhstan. Annexing territory and a full-scale invasion cannot be ruled out in the long term.

  1. Radicalization – Russkiy Mir expands

In this scenario, Russia gains military and economical control over Kazakhstan. The fresh fascist government in Moscow would take advantage of its neighbour by trying to gain control over its abroad trade and resources. This would impact the Russian economy and lead to strong militarization. Establishing a puppet government would be the second step, followed by Russification policies and the imposition of strict controls on expressions of Kazakh culture. Even though the Russian government would have control of most of Kazakhstan, it could besides effort to annex northern parts of the country.

  1. Radicalization – Moscow is silent

This is simply a script in which Russia is isolated, distant, and lacks the capabilities to task its power. No substance the result of the war in Ukraine, Russia would find itself in a weaker political and economical situation. It would not have the capacity to intervene in Kazakhstan. However, a fresh fascist regime, desperate to get control and regain power as a major geopolitical actor, would scare Kazakhstan, which would effort to get closer to others for protection like China, the EU, or the US. The fresh government in Moscow may besides effort to overthrow the Kazakh government by promoting separatism and utilizing cyber-attacks, closing the border, and expelling the Kazakh population from Russia. Any answer by the Kazakh government would be utilized as an excuse, but an invasion and large-scale attacks would not happen immediately, considering Russia’s weakness.

  1. Time of troubles – Multi-vectorism

Given an increasingly unstable and possibly more unpredictable Russia, Kazakhstan could make ties with another regional states to balance the possible fresh threats emanating from Russia. However, Kazakhstan would proceed to keep close ties with the Kremlin to prevent any hostile Russian reaction.

  1. Time of troubles – Russkiy Mir expands

An over-extended Russia might effort to increase cooperation with Kazakhstan to safe its long confederate border against drug smuggling and illegal migration. Nevertheless, it is improbable that an unstable and weakened Russia would be able to deepen its existing ties with Kazakhstan, especially given Astana’s expanding hesitancy regarding Russian-led integration projects specified as the Eurasian economical Union.

  1. Time of troubles – Moscow is silent

If Russia’s capacity to task its geopolitical influence and economical clout abroad is importantly weakened, then Kazakhstan could usage this chance to deepen ties with another regional powers. Kazakhstan will likely hedge its bets against an unstable Russia by expanding economical and military ties with EU, US, and China. At the same time, it would assert its independency by promoting national Kazakh policies domestically.

Black Swan events

Any major unpredictable and abrupt event could change these scenarios. A coup d’etat in Russia or Kazakhstan could lead to a extremist change in local politics and affect Russian capabilities. Even though it is possible that a fresh democratic government would arise after this, it is unlikely. The fresh government might be more aggressive and thus the anticipation of further aggression may increase. Instability in Russia besides might make Kazakhstan act more boldly on its intentions to make closer ties with another countries like the US, China, and Turkey. another possible events that could change the presented scenarios would happen in Central Asia or Kazakhstan itself. A abrupt government change in Astana could lead to a major transformation. A fresh government might be highly pro-Russian, pro-Chinese, or it might effort to build closer relations with the EU and the United States.

Conclusion

Overall, our analysis concludes that the most likely script in the short to average word is further autocratization in Russia under Putin’s regime, with Kazakhstan maintaining a multi-vector abroad policy. In the long term, the most likely script shifts to Russia losing influence over Kazakhstan and the Central Asian region to increasing economic, security, and cultural ties with China. Kazakhstan will hedge its bets against a revanchist Russia by forming closer ties with Beijing, as well as with the EU, US, and Turkey. However, given the unpredictable nature of Russia’s war in Ukraine, the result of the upcoming US election, and the possible of transformational black swan events, another scenarios are besides possible. 1 of them is the anticipation of a strengthened Russo-Chinese quasi-alliance should the US and EU decrease support for Ukraine. In this scenario, Russia has a advanced chance of achieving its nonsubjective of controlling Ukraine, while China is more likely to become emboldened to act aggressively in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait. Therefore, the future of bilateral relations between Russia and Kazakhstan is dependent as much on external as on interior variables. Whichever way events unfold, academics and policymakers alike request to realize all possible scenarios to implement more effective policies, prevent the worst outcomes, and prepare for the future.

Mariam Bitchoshvili is simply a task Assistant at the Trans European Policy Studies Association (TEPSA). She is besides an MA candidate, majoring in Central and East European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies at the University of Tartu and the University of Glasgow. Previously, she worked as a Program Associate at the United Nations Association of Georgia and as a Public Affairs Intern at the U.S. Embassy in Georgia.

Harry Fennell is presently pursuing a master’s degree in Central and East European, Russian and Eurasian Studies (CEERES) at KIMEP, the University of Glasgow and the University of Tartu. He besides works for Lossi 36, a student-led publication that publishes articles on Central and east Europe, Russia, the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Ignacio Hutin has a Licentiate in Journalism and MA in global Relations from Argentina. presently he is an Advisory Councillor of the Center for the beginning and improvement of Latin America (CADAL) for east Europe, Balkans and Eurasia, and is working for the online paper Infobae.

Zahar Hryniv is an MA student in European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies at the University of Glasgow and the University of Tartu. He is besides a student intern at the US Department of State and a investigation Assistant at the Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute. All views and opinions expressed are his own.


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