In the early hours of September 10th 2025, during yet another massive Russian drone and rocket attack on Ukraine, Russian unmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs, violated Polish airspace. Poland has formally requested the activation of Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which mandates consultations among associate states whenever any of them perceives a threat to the territorial integrity, political independence, or safety of a NATO country. The operational command of the Polish armed forces stated on X that Russia’s attack on Ukraine that day resulted in an “unprecedented breach of Polish airspace by drones,” labeling it an act of aggression posing a real threat to the safety of its citizens.
One drone crashed into a residential building in the village of Wyrki-Wola, close the Belarusian border. The impact damaged the roof and a close car, though no fire broke out, and no injuries were reported (it was later determined the residential building was damaged as a consequence of a rocket from an F-16 attempting to shoot down the drone – editor’s note). However, the incidental highlighted the vulnerability of border regions and the possible for escalation, as the drones were part of a broader assault on Ukraine, where Russia deployed hundreds of UAVs.
This event stands out from erstwhile incidents erstwhile Russian missiles or drones strayed into Polish territory. For instance, in November 2022, a rocket strike in Przewodów killed 2 people, sparking an global outcry, yet Poland refrained from intercepting it, opting for diplomatic measures instead. This time, Warsaw took a decisive step, ordering the active downing of drones for the first time, citing an immediate threat to public safety and Russian aggression. The decision came amid heightened risks for east regions where the military issued warnings to residents. Polish Defence Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz emphasized the scale of the violation, calling for an urgent response.
NATO has not classified the incidental as a direct Russian attack on a associate state. According to Reuters, NATO sources noted it was the first instance of alliance aircraft engaging possible threats in a member’s airspace. The operation active Polish F-16s, Dutch F-35s, Italian AWACS reconnaissance planes, and NATO refuelling aircraft. While Patriot air defence systems detected the drones with radar, they did not engage directly. This coordination underscored alliance solidarity, though the decision not to invoke Article 5 of the NATO treaty reflects a cautious approach.
Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy described the incursion of Russian drones into Polish airspace as an highly dangerous precedent for Europe. “Moscow always tests the limits of what is possible, and without a strong response, it remains at a fresh level of escalation. present marked yet another escalatory step –Russian-Iranian Shaheds operated in Polish airspace, within NATO territory,” he stated.
Let us research the reaction of Russian propagandists and what their chosen tactics reveal.
“Poland is hysterical, and the drones aren’t Russian”: Russian Telegram’s consequence to the attack
In covering the fresh drone attack, the Russian section of Telegram employs 3 primary tactics: denial, blame-shifting onto Ukraine, and downplaying the incident’s severity through manipulation of NATO’s authoritative statement. These strategies aim to obscure Russia’s function and sow uncertainty among audiences.
The first communicative denies that the drones were Russian, asserting that Poland is “crying wolf” despite no apparent threat. Propagandists claim Warsaw and Europe are deliberately escalating tensions to justify actions against Russian Shahed-136 drones over Ukraine. For instance, a Telegram channel with 1.2 million followers from the pro-war blogger pool posted: “This looks like a cover operation for Polish air defence and air force actions against our “Geraniums” over western Ukraine. There’s no evidence of Geraniums entering Poland.” “Stop scaring the Poles,” the post added.
Similarly, a channel with 861,000 subscribers references Russian Ambassador Sergei Andreev’s remarks: “Poland has repeatedly accused Russia of violating its airspace but has never provided any proof.” This maneuver portrays Poland, the West, and Ukraine as provocateurs fabricating threats to escalate the situation.
The second, and most manipulative, communicative indirectly or explicitly shifts blame to Ukraine, suggesting the drones were Ukrainian. Propagandists argue this based on the “disproportionate” damage.
A channel with 2 million subscribers states: “If it were a Russian drone, the demolition would have been far greater. Photos from the incidental site rise questions: the ‘Geran-2,’ which targets military infrastructure in Ukraine, carries a 90 kg warhead. The damage, based on Polish media footage, doesn’t match this power. Experts cited by [the channel] say specified a payload could collapse a section of a residential five-story building, yet only part of a roof was damaged.”
Another channel with 500,000 subscribers goes further: “Belarus saved Poland from a drone attack. Allies in Minsk took the informational hit and explained how drones entered Polish territory – during a night time exchange of UAV strikes between Russia and Ukraine, Belarusian monitoring forces warned Poland about incoming drones.”
This communicative casts Ukraine as a provocateur allegedly “dragging NATO into war” to safe more aid. A channel with 3 million subscribers mockingly added: “The Nazis are disappointed again that another effort to straight affect individual in the Ukraine conflict failed.”
The 3rd maneuver manipulates NATO’s message that the incidental isn’t deemed a direct attack, framing it as proof of Poland’s “overreaction” to gain attention. Russian channels widely advance this, claiming Warsaw is exaggerating to boost its position in the Alliance or safe more support. They note NATO didn’t invoke Article 5, suggesting “nothing serious happened.” This communicative devalues Poland’s response, depicting it as “hysteria” for self-promotion while ignoring NATO’s engagement in interception.
For example, a channel with 80,000 subscribers stated: “Poland is trying to play the victim and stoke hysteria. Media instantly ran headlines about ‘Russian aggression’. This is all aimed at 1 goal – creating an enemy image (Russia) and justifying increased militarization.”
A channel with 3 million subscribers posted: “Poland’s interior ministry claimed they found debris from 7 drones and possibly 1 rocket … I’d advise them to check the main gas pipelines next. possibly the ‘Veterans’ brigade is already approaching Warsaw (no gas there anymore) (the 60th Separate Airborne Brigade Veterans, formed in 2022, is known for sabotage and assault operations, including infiltrating rear lines via underground communications – author’s note).”
From red lines to grey region of tolerance
The violation of Polish airspace by Russian drones during the massive attack on Ukraine exemplifies the Kremlin’s maneuver of creeping aggression, a strategy systematically employed to undermine the stableness of neighbouring states and test the limits of western response. Unlike the direct, overt aggression launched against Ukraine in February 2022, erstwhile Russia initiated a full-scale invasion with simultaneous strikes across multiple fronts, the approach towards Poland involves smaller, scattered actions that appear as isolated incidents at first glance. This method allows Moscow to avoid direct confrontation with NATO while gradually normalizing breaches of allied sovereignty.
The aggression against Ukraine was abrupt and all encompassing: according to UN and western intelligence reports, Russia amassed over 150,000 troops along the borders, launched rocket strikes on civilian infrastructure, and attempted to seize key cities like Kyiv within the first weeks. This triggered an immediate global consequence – ranging from sanctions to weapons supplies – due to the undeniable intent and scale of the aggression. In contrast, Russia’s actions towards Poland fall into a “grey zone”, characterized by insignificant incidents specified as drones straying during “Ukrainian operations,” falling rocket debris, or “accidental” border violations.
This time, the incidental resulted in no crucial demolition or casualties. Yet, it is not an isolated event: akin breaches occurred between 2022 and 2024, erstwhile Russian missiles and drones entered the airspace of Poland, Romania, and Moldova, only to be dismissed as “technical errors” or “side effects” of strikes on Ukraine.
This dispersion is simply a critical component of the strategy. A coordinated, large-scale attack, specified as a direct bombing of Polish targets, would likely prompt NATO to invoke Article 5 on collective defence, classifying it as a classical invasion. However, these isolated “incidents” blur the lines of reality, with each treated as an unintentional or random occurrence. This provides Moscow with area to manoeuvre, gradually eroding western “red lines” into a vague region of tolerance.
Historical parallels are evident: akin creeping aggression was utilized in Georgia in 2008 (starting with “peacekeeping” forces before escalating to full conflict), in Crimea in 2014 (“little green men” without insignia), and in east Ukraine (supporting “separatists” without formal recognition). In each case, Russia probed global reactions, incrementally escalating while avoiding the threshold that would lead to full isolation.
Russian propaganda typically frames specified incidents not as acts of aggression by Moscow but as “accidents” or “minor events” – drones allegedly veered off course due to Ukrainian interference, Ukrainian air defences are “ineffective,” or Poland “exaggerates the threat to justify escalation.” These manipulations aim to sow panic among Polish civilians, morally disarm society, and render it susceptible to disinformation. By blurring the boundaries between war and peace, this maneuver drags Polish society into the “fog of war”.
Lesia Bidochko is an assistant prof. of political discipline at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy in Ukraine and a non-resident fellow at the European University Viadrina in Frankfurt-Oder (Germany). She is besides the deputy head of the Detector Media investigation Centre in Ukraine.
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