Why equating Ukraine’s future with post-war South Korea is simply a mistake

Stephen Kotkin, elder Fellow at the Hoover Institution, among others, has supported the thought of ending the Russian invasion of Ukraine on akin terms to the Korean War, with a divided country and a fresh DMZ (Demilitarized Zone). Advocating for a Ukrainian DMZ necessitates ignoring strategical differences and the geopolitical context. It besides embodies Cold War reasoning in a hot war minute that could lead to further escalation.

Pre-war Korea and Ukraine disagree importantly in terms of national identity, democratic status, and the nature of their conflict. The difference in ideological confrontation (communism versus capitalism) versus today’s (autocracy versus democracy) and/or (rules-based order versus. imperial ambitions), the scale of the conventional conflict (UN-U.S.-led intervention versus bi-lateral conflict with only allied safety assistance); and, most importantly, the power of the aggressor state, with the USSR far superior to contemporary Russia, all underscore the improbability and undesirability of a DMZ result for Ukraine.

Fundamental differences in comparing the conflicts

National Identity

Ukraine has a robust modern national identity, supported by a vast past that would be improbable to accept a DMZ reality. This is unlike Korea in 1953.

Ukraine has a long independent past from Russia, dating back to the ninth century, erstwhile Kyivan Rus’ was formed with the capital city of Kyiv. Moscow would not become a city until the 14th century. More recently, Ukraine has cemented its own sovereign national identity. In 2015, Ukraine passed its decommunization laws against russian monuments in Ukraine. In a Wilson Center survey about this legislation, about half of Ukrainians were unsure if rejecting russian past meant being a good Ukrainian citizen, but 92 per cent of respondents agreed that being a good citizen of Ukraine meant respecting the different cultures and ethnicities of citizens. At the same time, 96 per cent of respondents agreed that being a good citizen of Ukraine meant loyalty to the country independent of ethnicity, language and culture. Not only did Ukrainians find their identity independently from Russia, but they did so while recognizing that they did not gotta reject diversity in that identity, unlike Russia’s propagated identity in its close abroad.

In 2019, Ukraine made this decision outright by amending its constitution to include the “irreversibility of the European and Euro-Atlantic course of Ukraine” and the “confirmation of the European identity of the Ukrainian people”. An artificial DMZ established in Ukraine ignores the local realities. Whether in the country’s east or west, Ukraine is 1 united people, separate from Russia.

South and North Korea, on the another hand, were forced to separate prior to the establishment of the DMZ. Prior to nipponese annexation in 1910 and colonial regulation until 1945, Korea was unified and independent for nearly 1,000 years, with the exception of indirect regulation by the Mongols in the 13th century and a period of civilian war in the early tenth century. After nipponese rule, Korea was divided into American and russian zones through external geopolitics, leading to the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea). These more than 40 years of colonial regulation degraded the national identity that erstwhile was, leaving the Korean public susceptible to those on their borders with expansionist aspirations.

Democratic status

The Ukrainian people from inward orientation, have continuously progressed towards democracy in the last fewer decades, whereas South Korea in the early 20th century faced an externally opposed democratic transition that was slow to take hold among the populace.

Ukraine was 1 of the quickest to adopt democratic traits following the russian collapse. There were peaceful transfers of power within the legislative and executive powers, but there were inactive periods of democratic backsliding. However, 2 fresh historical moments defined Ukraine’s democratic leanings: the Orange Revolution (2004) and the Revolution of Dignity (or “Euromaidan”) (2014). The Orange Revolution was a mass public protest that occurred in consequence to the attempted rigging of a presidential election in favour of the country’s prime minister, Viktor Yanukovych. After 3 rounds of voting, Viktor Yushchenko emerged as the winner.

Ten years later, Yanukovych, now the sitting president, was again the democratic challenge in Ukraine’s way. In collusion with Russia, he backed distant from the EU Association Agreement in late 2013 to draw closer to Russia, sparking the Euromaidan protests and his ousting from government.

Despite crucial democratic challenges, in large part the consequence of both Russian conventional and hybrid war, Ukraine has chosen in favour of democracy, with most improving after 2014. Despite fighting a war in the east, the 2014 and 2019 elections produced reform-oriented parliamentarians and fresh democratic judicial improvement institutions, specified as the advanced Anti-Corruption Court and National Anti-Corruption Bureau.

As the United States and the russian Union agreed to the division of the Korean peninsula at the Moscow Conference of abroad Ministers in 1945, the first signs of attempts at a democratic transition occurred within South Korea. Given the fresh capitulation of nipponese colonial regulation following 35 years, Korea had small democratic foundations and a among political elites. The artificial division of the country at the 38th parallel exacerbated these conditions, frustrating the US’s commanding general in Korea, General John R. Hodge, who, without knowing Korea’s culture or grievances, struggled to seed its democratic future.

A post-colonized Korea, divided in 2 in a bipolar hegemonic world, shares small in governing and populous orientation with the independent, sovereign and democratic Ukraine of today.

Nature of the conflict

The Korean War was at the forefront of the Cold War, with complete western engagement against Soviet, Chinese and North Korean forces. This conflict resulted in millions of casualties in Korea, as well as the complete demolition of infrastructure. In contrast, the conflict in Ukraine has been more limited, with the West yet to exhaust all avenues for countering aggression. Ukraine fights its war alone, supported only by financing, sanctions and diplomatic pressure.

Furthermore, the DMZ was only feasible with full conventional US military support. This included boots on the ground in the conflict and a long-term post-conflict military presence. Ukraine would request the same support from NATO, but the Alliance is not in the same position as the UN and US in 1953. Approaching the NATO summit in Washington DC, there has been small talk of binding NATO or the West to Ukraine’s opposition against Russia. The only exception has been French president Macron’s call to not limit the anticipation of deploying NATO forces in Ukraine. As such, the scale of resources and strategies has not yet been exhausted to entertain the thought of a DMZ in Ukraine, as it was in Korea.

The difference in ideological confrontation and context

The Korean War was a proxy of the Cold War, a conflict between the communist and capitalist models, a large experimentation in determining the success of each model on mirroring nations and populations. Whereas Putin’s war in Ukraine is the conflict of an expansionist imperial autocratic government in a democratic nation, which in turn is fighting to uphold the rules-based order that has defined this century, built off the work accomplished by NATO and the United Nations since 1945.

Accepting or promoting the thought of a DMZ in Ukraine ignores Putin’s declared aspirations to revive the legacy of Peter the large in today’s Russia. It, in turn, ignores the power differential between NATO and today’s Russia and the bipolar planet of the 1950s. Russia present has the economical power of Spain or the US state of Texas. In all domains – land, air, sea and cyber – NATO has about 5 times the force capability. Accepting a settlement to divide an unwilling democratic population with a more limited rogue nation will only origin further reverberations of disorder for the next century.

Two very distinct conflicts

The Korean War and the Russian invasion of Ukraine are 2 very different conflicts in different contexts. Applying lessons from 1 to the another requires simplification to the degree of nullifying the facts of reality. Advocating for a Ukrainian DMZ signals a return to Cold War reasoning and/or the designation that we never left it. Therefore, it may appear that the US never won the first time around. The Korean War’s conclusion entrenched the Cold War divide, solidified Korea’s division into 2 ideologically opposed states, and escalated the arms race. specified outcomes are undesirable in Ukraine and surely undesirable on the European continent at the borders of NATO and the EU.

While South Korea became a western democratic power, North Korea has besides maintained its own stature. It has now fuelled Russia’s invasion of Ukraine by manufacturing an tremendous quantity of artillery for Moscow. Aiming for a Ukrainian DMZ not only ignores the players’ different geopolitical contexts and realities, but it besides returns to a Cold War mindset, which in the best case, only delays and emboldens further aggression.

Stephen Kotkin posits that if you asked the South Koreans today, knowing now that they are a thriving economy and democracy in Asia, if they would have opposed the 38th parallel divide, believing they would be content in their response, I would ask him to alternatively position that question for the 26 million North Koreans, who now live under tyrannical regulation in desperate conditions. I would further ask him to ask how the Ukrainians feel about that divide, knowing that the DPRK now facilitates Russia’s invasion. I would besides ask him to pose that question to the families divided arbitrarily by this divide in Korea, erstwhile 1 people, now divided forever. I am certain that in seeking those answers, Kotkin’s DMZ advocacy would fall under any doubt. Korea’s DMZ was not the consequence of it being a favorable solution, but due to the fact that all another options were exhausted.

Samuel Dempsey is simply a geopolitical investigator and analyst at ITSS Verona and European Horizons, a defence consulting associate to Dr. Can Kasapoglu, and an incoming Presidential Management Fellow in the Department of State. He works on transatlantic defence and safety issues through an interdisciplinary and economical perspective. He holds an M.A. in Geopolitics and strategical Studies from the Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Spain and a B.A. in Journalism and Communications from Anglo American University Prague, Czech Republic.