During the night of September 9th and 10th 2025, Russian aerial attack systems entered Polish airspace, which in effect meant a violation of NATO airspace. According to information provided by Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski, the airspace was breached 19 times by Russian-made drones. In its authoritative communiqué, the Operational Command of the Armed Forces of Poland described the incidental as an act of aggression, a characterization with crucial political implications, although at this phase it may be more accurately described as a provocation on an unprecedented scale.
Last night, Poland’s airspace was breached 19 times by drones manufactured in Russia. Our assessment is that they did not veer off course but were deliberately targeted.
Poland, EU and NATO will not be intimidated and we will proceed to stand by the brave people of Ukraine.… pic.twitter.com/prAEqrIUKX
— Radosław Sikorski (@sikorskiradek) September 10, 2025
In consequence to the incursion, the Polish air force and allied forces stationed on NATO’s east flank were activated, including Dutch, Italian, and German units. Assets deployed included F-35 and F-16 fighter jets, Mi-24, Mi-17, and Black Hawk helicopters. The scale of the operation is illustrated by information disclosed by Prime Minister Donald Tusk, who reported that the first incursion was recorded on September 9th at 11:30PM and the last at 06:30AM the next day. The minister of defence, Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz, disclosed further that the mission started before 9:00PM. Further evidence of the scale of the operation includes the flight way and duration of a Polish Air Force Saab 340 AEW&C AWACS aircraft as well as the engagement of a US KC-135R Stratotanker.
The Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, General Wiesław Kukuła, explained that the crucial number of air defence systems active in the operation stemmed from expectations of a larger-scale provocation, and that Polish and Dutch pilots had received pre-authorization to neutralize targets. Not all drones that violated Polish airspace were neutralized, nevertheless – the exact number remains unknown.
In his statements on X, General Kukuła emphasized that the actions were intentional, and that the Air Force refrained from shooting down Geran decoy drones, remnants of which were later found deeper within Polish territory. Instead, the operation focused on neutralizing armed aerial attack systems, which had likely entered Polish airspace in order to confuse Ukrainian air defence systems, a maneuver Russia had employed on respective erstwhile occasions. This fact only marginally diminishes the importance of this unprecedented escalation by Russia against NATO.
Moscow’s objectives were not limited to misleading Ukrainian air defences, but besides included:
- testing the speed, scale, and capabilities of NATO’s air defence response, including the collection of information through electronic intelligence (ELINT);
- demonstrating offensive capabilities in order to intimidate adversaries and extract political concessions;
- exposing perceived weaknesses in Poland’s state and its defence capacities;
- casting uncertainty on allied reliability and thereby undermining trust in NATO safety guarantees;
- reducing western support for Ukraine;
- the creation of content for the intent of disinformation activities, and others.
Furthermore, the possible of Russia launching an attack, even with unarmed decoy drones, is politically challenging to accept at this point. The issue will become more evident if a nonarmed drone utilising kinetic force results in crucial demolition or the failure of life among NATO citizens. To date, this has not yet happened. However, there has been an increase in the number of both intentional and unintentional violations of NATO airspace in fresh years. The employment of a salami slicing strategy by Russia has thus far not resulted in a robust consequence that would be commensurate with that observed, for instance, in November 2015. Russia has been observed to be increasingly investigating the limits of NATO’s tolerance, with a very soft consequence from the alliance. In light of Russia’s modus operandi, the weakness of the consequence serves only to embolden Russia to continue.
It should be noted that the decision to shoot down Russian aerial assets was itself unprecedented for NATO’s east flank. Despite the limited scale of the provocation, the operation demonstrated that NATO interoperability remains at a advanced level. A separate issue, however, concerns the use of advanced fighter jets and air-to-air missiles specified as AIM-9 Sidewinders and AIM-120s to neutralize technologically unsophisticated drones. This negatively affects cost-effectiveness ratios and partially exposes weaknesses in Poland’s air defence system, which remains inadequately adapted to countering drone-based threats.
Political reactions from Poland’s allies varied. Almost all NATO members issued statements of solidarity, though any with logic hard to accept in Poland, including Viktor Orbán of Hungary and Robert Fico of Slovakia. Still, these responses caused little consternation than the absence of any message from the highest US authorities. US president Donald Trump limited himself to an enigmatic post on fact Social: “What’s with Russia violating Poland’s airspace with drones? Here we go!”
Similarly, Polish president Karol Nawrocki’s laconic post on X, following a telephone consultation with Trump, noted only assurances of allied unity but failed to clarify Washington’s position. The situation was further complicated by Vice president JD Vance’s message to One America News, made after the incursion, in which he remarked that president Trump “doesn’t see any reason why we should economically isolate Russia”.
Clearly, in the current safety context, actions substance more than words and at this stage, there is no basis to presume that the United States might engage in possible allied disloyalty. After all, the US armed forces have been engaged in operations over Polish airspace, whether materially, through intelligence activities, or within the framework of command structures. Yet Washington’s conspicuous silence and deficiency of commitments, for instance regarding the strengthening of air defences over Poland or NATO’s east flank more broadly, have provoked concern and undermined assurance in the United States as a safety guarantor and may only encourage Russia to prosecute further provocations.
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In Poland, observers besides note a broader shift in US policy towards prioritizing home issues over external ones. A striking example is the Trump administration’s near-exclusive focus on the assassination of Charlie Kirk, while mostly ignoring the airspace violations over Poland. This could have applicable consequences for Polish-American cooperation, including arms procurement and energy contracts. The current Polish government has already signalled the necessity of pursuing a multi-vector policy and deepening cooperation with European allies in this matter. Especially given the fact that unlike Washington, European partners promptly pledged concrete support in consequence to Russia’s actions.
In reaction to Russia’s actions, Poland invoked Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty and requested urgent consultations, which took place on September 10th. On the evening of September 12th, Mark Rutte, NATO secretary general, and General Alexus Grynkewich, the ultimate Allied Commander, announced the launch of Operation east Sentry, which is likely to be a duplicate operation to Baltic Sentry in order to safe the east flank against Russian provocations. Moreover, in its strategy of internationalising the crisis and providing the global community with accurate information regarding the actual course of events, Poland besides requested the convening of an emergency gathering of the UN safety Council. Meanwhile, voices calling for a more assertive policy towards Russia are expanding in Poland, and it is likely that this will influence the political class, which is gradually drifting towards more extremist measures aimed at deterring Russia.
Finally, the broader global context must besides be noted. An interesting aspect, confirmed by General Kukuła, was that Poland had been warned about the incoming aerial assault by Belarus. In fresh weeks, Belarus had sent messages to Warsaw signalling its willingness to de-escalate, for example by proposing meetings, announcing the Zapad 20205 exercises could take place further distant from the border with Poland, or most late informing of possible Russian provocations. It remains unclear whether Belarus, as Russia’s ally, is playing the function of “good cop,” or whether, recognizing the depth of its dependency on Moscow, it seeks to return to its pre-2022 policy of balancing between Russia and the West. It is equally plausible that Belarus simply sought to trigger the operation of Polish air defence systems in order to collect data, for instance on the usage of their frequencies.
What is more, on Monday Chinese abroad Minister Wang Yi besides visited Poland, possibly created an chance to improve Sino-Polish relations, which had suffered Warsaw prioritized ties with the US over China. Earlier, Chinese intervention had contributed to a simplification in migration force from Belarus. Starting on September 12th, Poland has besides closed its border with Belarus indefinitely due to the ongoing Zapad 2025 manoeuvres. The Polish-Belarusian border is the primary entry point for Chinese rail freight into the European Union, which is not without significance. Shortly after the visit, the Polish side announced that it had no intention of reopening the border with Belarus. The outcomes of the visit, however, stay ambiguous. The parties refrained from issuing a joint message afterwards. It was nevertheless reported that China intends to support Poland in its efforts to join the G20—a step previously suggested by Donald Trump.
Lastly, the safety situation in NATO’s east airspace is further complicated by US administration’s preoccupation with developments in the mediate East, where Israeli forces have late carried out strikes on Hamas leaders residing in Doha, Qatar.
Jakub Bornio is an assistant prof. at the University of Wrocław and a elder analyst at the Institute of Central Europe in Lublin. He holds a PhD in political discipline with a specialty in global relations. He publishes regularly for Defence24, the Jamestown Foundation and New east Europe.
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