LILIIA SHUTIAK: From late autumn last year until May this year, Romania was in the spotlight. It seems that Romania has miraculously avoided turning toward an anti-western path. Nicușor Dan’s triumph brings a dose of optimism. But given the series of political crises in little than the last 365 days, where is Romania now?
RUFIN ZAMFIR: That’s by no means an easy question. There are many layers to unpack. But I think a good starting point for knowing Romania today, both the state and society at large, is this: Romania is discovering the benefits of being a democracy, while at the same time struggling to navigate the responsibilities that come with it. We’re inactive a very young democracy. Until 1990, Romania had never truly experienced democratic governance – not between the wars, and surely not under communism.
So the Romanian people are only now beginning to realize the value of no longer surviving under an authoritarian regime. But at the same time, there’s a increasing frustration: democracy comes with costs. There’s no longer a “nanny in the palace” making decisions for you and alternatively of you. Citizens must engage in their communities, in their regions, in national affairs. That’s part of the democratic deal.
When it comes to the state and institutions, things are more complicated. Romania presently lacks a national task – something clear and unifying, like we had during the push to join the European Union, NATO, or even the Schengen Area. Back then, we saw serious investment – diplomatic, economic, safety – to scope those goals. Today, there’s no specified overarching vision. The 1 consistent strategy is to keep Romania on a democratic path, within the frameworks of the EU and NATO.
That’s not just about popular support which, by the way, has grown stronger in fresh years, especially since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, but besides about organization commitment. Ministries, the military, and another state bodies now seem even more convinced that Romania’s place is firmly within these western structures. Of course, we definitely request to contact on the forces trying to derail this democratic trajectory. But for now, I’m focusing on how Romanian institutions function, how well they work together, and whether that organization synergy can actually form a broader strategy.
At the same time, the war in Ukraine has reopened respective crucial debates within Romanian public discourse. 1 of them is Romania’s function in NATO. The EU is inactive mostly seen as a origin of backing with minimal obligations. But NATO for the first time is now being openly discussed in terms of Romania’s deeper responsibilities and commitments as a member.
Do you besides mean whether Romania should stay in NATO?
Virtually all political actors in Romania agree that the country should stay in NATO. Even those who occasionally voice opposing views tend to backtrack erstwhile pressed to justify their position. Membership in NATO is fundamentally a given and almost everyone supports it.
The real debate isn’t about whether Romania should stay in NATO, but alternatively about the function it should play within the Alliance. There’s a politicization of the perception that Romania holds a second-tier position in NATO. And in public discourse, method facts frequently don’t matter. For instance, fewer people know that all NATO decisions require unanimity. This deficiency of awareness is exploited by manipulative actors who ask questions like, “Why is Romania treated the same as Albania or Montenegro in NATO erstwhile we’re so much larger?”
It’s a form of extremist populism, capitalizing on ignorance – and for the first time since the war in Ukraine began, NATO has become a mark for this kind of narrative. That said, these voices remain, at least for now, on the margins. At the political level, however, Romania finds itself in a troubling place. The quality of our democracy and of our political class is at its lowest in the past 30 years. Sadly, Romania is echoing global trends. any of those were set in motion by Donald Trump in Washington, while others are evident among European politicians who openly challenge democratic principles or manipulate them to service individual or organization interests.
Right now, about a 3rd of Romania’s parliament is made up of politicians whose platform is based on slogans like “sovereignty first” and economical nationalism. erstwhile in parliament, not all of those ideas turn into policy, especially since these parties are in opposition and deficiency governing power. Still, they influence the political agenda in Bucharest. Their impact is felt little through direct action and more through inaction. I don’t anticipate the current government to adopt far-right policies. Rather, I fear they will avoid essential reforms or shy distant from delicate issues, knowing that the far right could exploit them.
This political stagnation has consequences beyond Romania’s borders. The first affected neighbour is Moldova, which depends on Romania not only for economical aid but besides for diplomatic backing, peculiarly in Brussels and another global settings. The second is Ukraine. I’m not suggesting Romania will abruptly reverse its position on supporting Ukraine. But I do believe that support may slow down or become more conditional. That’s just my assessment. Romania will follow Trump’s decisions regarding Ukraine. If Washington asks Romania to step up, it likely will. But if there’s silence or ambiguity, Romania may hold or scale back its support. Why? due to the fact that the issue has become politically sensitive. It was weaponized during the election campaign, and the ruling parties are reluctant to lose even more political capital by taking bold stances.
Romania and Ukraine share a large deal in common. What aspects of Romania’s experience could Ukraine draw on erstwhile it comes to building a political nation, integrating cultural minorities, and moving towards EU membership?
Let me give you an example of a situation that could service as a possible lesson for Ukraine and 1 we’re rather arrogant of at the political level in Romania. During the early stages of Romania’s accession to the EU and NATO, there was strong political consensus across the major parties. They all sat at the same table and negotiated how the goal of the EU and NATO membership could align with their respective agendas. In the end, they reached an agreement: no political actor or organization would publically argue anything related to the accession process.
This meant that budget allocations – for example, to strengthen the military – were secured without major opposition in parliament. Public statements supporting the EU and NATO membership went mostly unchallenged. This cross-party consensus allowed Romania to decision forward more rapidly with interior reforms, even if the process inactive took time. This agreement became known as the Snagov Dialogue, named after the tiny town where it was held.
With only insignificant exceptions, all major political parties worked together to implement the reforms needed for Romania to join both NATO and the EU. That was a affirmative lesson. But there’s besides a cautionary tale in how these processes were carried out. The dialog itself and the consensus were conducted and reached in a mostly non-transparent way, driven by the political elite, with small meaningful communication to the public.
While the NATO accession didn’t make major problems in terms of public acceptance, EU membership was a different story. The EU accession process was presented to Romanians as something that would bring only benefits – more wealth, more rights – without any discussion of obligations. No 1 explained what EU membership actually meant. For example, people weren’t told that as a associate state, Romania would be expected to uphold the rights of ethnic, spiritual and sexual minorities. These topics stay delicate and controversial in Romania present and have fuelled Eurosceptic narratives among any segments of the population.
Another misstep by the political elite was the failure to prepare citizens, peculiarly in agrarian and agricultural areas, for the uneven outcomes of EU membership. These communities, in many ways, have been left behind. No policies were put in place to mitigate the impact on them, and they stay among those who feel they have gained little, if anything, from EU integration. This is something Ukraine should carefully consider. Alongside structural reforms and diplomacy, public communication and social cohesion are essential to the long-term success of any integration process.
In Romania, there is simply a Hungarian issue tied to long-standing phobia that Hungary may search to reclaim Transylvania or push for any form of autonomy in the region. These matters frequently surface on the parliamentary agenda, frequently due to the presence of parties like the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania. Currently, 3 members of the Hungarian organization service in the Romanian government, which reflects a strong political mandate. This raises a crucial question: how can a state grant minorities not only cultural autonomy but besides meaningful political representation, support in cultural community building, while at the same time avoid the risks of separatism, revanchism, or irredentism? How is Romania navigating this challenge?
Let’s begin by dividing the issue into 2 parts: first, the number in relation to the majority; then, the majority in relation to the minority. The Hungarian number in Romania has historically been vilified – not just during communism, but even before. Under Ceaușescu, there was a systematic effort to represent cultural Hungarians as “the enemy within”. As a result, many Romanians, even those who had never met a Hungarian, developed negative perceptions. They might not have considered them outright enemies, but surely saw them as problematic. Why? due to the fact that Hungarians were perceived as unwilling to integrate, despite the fact that no meaningful policies existed to support their social or cultural integration. Ceaușescu surely wasn’t curious in that.
Naturally, this exclusion pushed the Hungarian community to look elsewhere for support. Over the past 12–15 years, that “elsewhere” has increasingly been Viktor Orbán and Budapest. The Hungarian government has invested heavy in Romania’s Hungarian number – backing virtually all Hungarian-language media outlets in the country, and subsidizing Hungarian farmers. Meanwhile, Bucharest has done small to aid these communities thrive. This disparity only deepens the perception that there is simply a group within Romania that is someway ‘other’ – not full part of the nation, and possibly even obstructing its progress.
What’s crucial to realize about the current situation is that acknowledging the presence of a Hungarian number is not enough. Appointing representatives of that number to government, for instance, by forming coalitions with their party, does not absolve the Romanian state of work for these citizens. For years, peculiarly under the Social Democrats, Romanian governments assumed that simply including them in governing coalitions would “solve” the Hungarian number issue. It didn’t. This is partially why they inactive occasionally push for full autonomy in regions where Hungarians form a local majority. Do they genuinely believe autonomy is the solution? most likely not. But they feel the request to offer something – any imagination – to their constituents. And since they conflict to deliver tangible benefits like better healthcare, education, or social services, they turn to symbolic goals like autonomy. It’s a political mirage.
This is simply a lesson Ukraine would do well to survey carefully. From the outside, the situation of the Hungarian number in Romania might not seem alarming – and it’s not disastrous – but it’s surely not as unchangeable as it could be. Hungarian and Romanian communities are now more divided than before. It’s like 2 blocks of ice slow drifting apart. The gap is growing, not closing. And what’s most troubling is that there’s very small political will to change that.
This publication was compiled by the Institute for Central European strategy (ICES) with the support of the European Union and the global Renaissance Foundation within the framework “Whole-of-Society Accession” project. Its content is the exclusive work of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union and the global Renaissance Foundation.
Rufin Zamfir is simply a elder expert at the GlobalFocus Center, where he specializes in the emergence of the Romanian and European extremist right and extremist populism.
Liliia Shutiak is a regional coordinator of the Re:Open Ukraine initiative.
